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T1619 Cloud Storage Object Discovery — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage. Similar to File and Directory Discovery on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. Cloud Infrastructure Discovery) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure. Cloud…

Complete technique description

Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage. Similar to File and Directory Discovery on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. Cloud Infrastructure Discovery) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure.

Cloud service providers offer APIs allowing users to enumerate objects stored within cloud storage. Examples include ListObjectsV2 in AWS [ListObjectsV2] and List Blobs in Azure[List Blobs] .

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

Cloud Storage Access · source-mapped

DC0025 collection page — Explicitly select relevant object-read data events; keep principal, key, request ID and result without object contents.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Choose only the lab buckets/containers and prefixes. Enable read/write data-event collection when object access is needed; management events alone are insufficient.
  • Keep administrative changes separately from object reads/writes. Set a cost budget and retention limit before enabling high-volume data logging.
  • Preserve object version/key, requesting identity, action, source address, result and request ID. Verify the collector actually receives one benign read and one benign write.

Required normalized fields: action, bucket, key, actor, result.

[
  {
    "Name": "LabObjectReads",
    "FieldSelectors": [
      {
        "Field": "eventCategory",
        "Equals": [
          "Data"
        ]
      },
      {
        "Field": "resources.type",
        "Equals": [
          "AWS::S3::Object"
        ]
      },
      {
        "Field": "resources.ARN",
        "StartsWith": [
          "arn:aws:s3:::lab-bucket/demo/"
        ]
      },
      {
        "Field": "readOnly",
        "Equals": [
          "true"
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
]

Replace the placeholder with an owned lab bucket/prefix. Review costs and merge with required selectors; applying selectors can replace an existing selection. This does not enable management-event retention or object-write coverage.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0025",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "action": "get_object",
    "bucket": "lab-bucket",
    "key": "demo.txt",
    "actor": "lab-reader",
    "result": "success"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Storage metadata, listing, object access and bucket administration are different operations. Do not equate a successful request with proven exfiltration or complete content visibility.

Cloud Storage Enumeration · source-mapped

DC0017 collection page — Log list operations at the applicable API layer and preserve target prefix, caller, pagination and outcome; check event-selector support for the specific API.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Choose only the lab buckets/containers and prefixes. Enable read/write data-event collection when object access is needed; management events alone are insufficient.
  • Keep administrative changes separately from object reads/writes. Set a cost budget and retention limit before enabling high-volume data logging.
  • Preserve object version/key, requesting identity, action, source address, result and request ID. Verify the collector actually receives one benign read and one benign write.

Required normalized fields: action, bucket, prefix, actor, result.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0017",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "action": "list_objects",
    "bucket": "lab-bucket",
    "prefix": "demo/",
    "actor": "lab-reader",
    "result": "success"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Storage metadata, listing, object access and bucket administration are different operations. Do not equate a successful request with proven exfiltration or complete content visibility.

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

DET0578 Detection Strategy for Cloud Storage Object Discovery

MITRE detection strategy

AN1594 Analytic 1594

Detection of suspicious enumeration of cloud storage objects via API calls such as AWS S3 ListObjectsV2, Azure List Blobs, or GCP ListObjects. Correlate access with account role, user context, and prior authentication activity to identify anomalous usage patterns (e.g., unusual account, unexpected regions, or large-scale enumeration in short time windows).

Platforms: IaaS.

Source rule directory and observation requirements

1 exact-tagged source rules. A source tag is a discovery aid, not a relevance verdict. Check the observation point and actual condition of each rule.

Before treating a rule as coverage

  1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
  2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
  3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
  4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1619 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

  • Cloud storage: Per principal and bucket/container: unusual object-read counts, transferred volume, new access pairs and bulk permission/deletion activity. Model backups, migrations and lifecycle policies separately.
  1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
  2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
  3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
  4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

Software observed in source procedures

These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.

3 source-documented software associations

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: 4 compatible documented candidates. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.

Azure - Enumerate Storage Account Objects via Shared Key authorization using Azure CLI

This test enumerates all existing storage accounts and tries to fetch for each account the contained storage account objects. The access to storage objects is only possible if Shared Key authorization is enabled (e.g this is the case per default for storage objects creaded by Azure Function Apps).

Requirements:
- The test is intended to be executed in interactive mode (with -Interactive parameter) in order to complete the az login command when MFA is required.
- The EntraID user must have the role "Storage Account Contributor", or a role with similar permissions.

Output format: Csv file that contains the found storage account objects
- Columns: ResourceGroup, StorageAccountName, FileShareName, ContainerName, BlobName, TableName, QueueName
- The content of these columns is filled out depending on the object. Not-required columns are left empt. Example: For a blob object the ResourceGroup, StorageAccountName, ContainerName, BlobName are filled out, the other fields are left empty.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 070322a4-2c60-4c50-8ffb-c450a34fe7bf · iaas:azure · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • output_file: Csv file path for results (type path; source default $env:temp\T1619_storage_account_objects.csv)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • Azure CLI must be installed
Azure - Scan for Anonymous Access to Azure Storage (Powershell)

Upon successful execution, this test will test for anonymous access to Azure storage containers by invoking a web request and outputting the results to a file.
The corresponding response could then be interpreted to determine whether or not the resource/container exists, as well as other information.
See https://ninocrudele.com/the-three-most-effective-and-dangerous-cyberattacks-to-azure-and-countermeasures-part-2-attack-the-azure-storage-service

Pinned Atomic procedure · 146af1f1-b74e-4aa7-9895-505eb559b4b0 · iaas:azure · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • base_name: Azure storage account name to test (type string; source default T1619Test2)
  • output_file: File to output results to (type string; source default $env:temp\T1619Test2.txt)
  • container_name: Container name to search for (optional) (type string; source default )
  • blob_name: Blob name to search for (optional) (type string; source default )

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

AWS S3 Enumeration

This test will enumerate all the S3 buckets in the user account and lists all the files in each bucket.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 3c7094f8-71ec-4917-aeb8-a633d7ec4ef5 · iaas:aws · sh.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • Check if ~/.aws/credentials file has a default stanza is configured
Azure - Enumerate Azure Blobs with MicroBurst

Upon successful execution, this test will utilize a wordlist to enumerate the public facing containers and blobs of a specified Azure storage account.
See https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/cloud-penetration-testing/anonymously-enumerating-azure-file-resources/ .

Pinned Atomic procedure · 3dab4bcc-667f-4459-aea7-4162dd2d6590 · iaas:azure · powershell.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • base: Azure blob keyword to enumerate (Example, storage account name) (type string; source default secure)
  • output_file: File to output results to (type string; source default $env:temp\T1619Test1.txt)
  • wordlist: File path to keywords for search permutations (type string; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads\permutations.txt)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

2 prerequisite definitions:

  • The Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs module must exist in PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads.
  • The wordlist file for search permutations must exist in PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads.

Technique-specific experiment contract

  1. Choose one procedure implementing T1619 Cloud Storage Object Discovery; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
  2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
  3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
  4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
  5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Cloud Storage Object Discovery, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

Source-linked mitigations

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Source procedure platform / method / executor tags:

Detection and collection

T1619 detection workspace

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.