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T1525 Implant Internal Image — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike Upload Malware, this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s…

Complete technique description

Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike Upload Malware, this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim’s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image.[Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019]

A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images.[Rhino Labs Cloud Backdoor September 2019] If an adversary has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a Web Shell.[Rhino Labs Cloud Image Backdoor Technique Sept 2019]

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

Image Creation · source-mapped

DC0015 collection page — Collect VM image create/register APIs from the cloud control plane; retain source instance/disk, image ID and final state. Container image events are a separate concept.

Providers and collection configuration

  • In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.
  • Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.
  • Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies.

Required normalized fields: image_id, source_instance, action, state.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0015",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "image_id": "image-lab-1",
    "source_instance": "vm-lab-1",
    "action": "create",
    "state": "pending"
  }
}

Visibility limits: AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.

Image Modification · source-mapped

DC0036 collection page — Collect cloud image-modification APIs and before/after attributes, including launch/sharing permissions; keep VM images distinct from container tags.

Providers and collection configuration

  • In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.
  • Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.
  • Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies.

Required normalized fields: image_id, attribute, before, after.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0036",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "image_id": "image-lab-1",
    "attribute": "launch_permission",
    "before": [
      "lab-account"
    ],
    "after": [
      "lab-account",
      "lab-account-2"
    ]
  }
}

Visibility limits: AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.

Instance Start · source-mapped

DC0080 collection page — Collect start APIs and instance-state transitions with request IDs; distinguish accepted from completed.

Providers and collection configuration

  • In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.
  • Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.
  • Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies.

Required normalized fields: instance_id, action, state_before, state_after.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0080",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "instance_id": "vm-lab-1",
    "action": "start",
    "state_before": "stopped",
    "state_after": "pending"
  }
}

Visibility limits: AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

DET0334 Detection Strategy for T1525 – Implant Internal Image

MITRE detection strategy

AN0946 Analytic 0946

Implantation of malicious code into container images followed by registry push and use in new deployments.

Platforms: Containers.

  • Image Creation — docker:daemon; channel docker build or docker commit commands followed by docker push to internal registry.
  • Image Modification — docker:registry; channel push event of new image version from unrecognized user or context.

AN0947 Analytic 0947

Creation or modification of cloud virtual machine images (AMIs, custom images) with persistence mechanisms, followed by infrastructure provisioning that uses these implanted images.

Platforms: IaaS.

Source rule directory and observation requirements

1 exact-tagged source rules. A source tag is a discovery aid, not a relevance verdict. Check the observation point and actual condition of each rule.

Before treating a rule as coverage

  1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
  2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
  3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
  4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1525 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

  • Cloud control plane: Per account, role, region and API: rare actions, new role-resource relationships, enumeration bursts and configuration changes. Separate deployment automation and organization-level administrative activity.
  1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
  2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
  3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
  4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

No reviewed lab-tool association is selected for this exact technique. This is a curation gap, not a statement that no tool can implement the behavior.

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: no compatible candidate in this snapshot. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.

No compatible Atomic procedure is present in this pinned evidence set. Technical feasibility has not been ruled out. A custom procedure must define the behavior, target, collection point, success observable and rollback before execution.

Technique-specific experiment contract

  1. Choose one procedure implementing T1525 Implant Internal Image; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
  2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
  3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
  4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
  5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Implant Internal Image, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

Source-linked mitigations

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

enterprisecloudcontainersIaaSContainerspersistenceisolated_authorized_labprocedure_review_requiredtelemetry_configuration_requireddisposable_tenant_and_cost_controls
No Atomic candidate in snapshottechniquesource_mapped

Detection and collection

T1525 detection workspace

No reviewed association in this snapshot.

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.