1200kmSECURITY RESEARCH
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T1040 Network Sniffing — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a…

Complete technique description

Adversaries may passively sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay, can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.

Network sniffing may reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Stealth activities. Adversaries may likely also utilize network sniffing during Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) to passively gain additional knowledge about the environment.

In cloud-based environments, adversaries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to.[AWS Traffic Mirroring][GCP Packet Mirroring][Azure Virtual Network TAP] Often, much of this traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS termination at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encrypting and decrypting traffic.[Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring][SpecterOps AWS Traffic Mirroring] The adversary can then use exfiltration techniques such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access the sniffed traffic.[Rhino Security Labs AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring]

On network devices, adversaries may perform network captures using Network Device CLI commands such as `monitor capture`.[US-CERT-TA18-106A][capture_embedded_packet_on_software]

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

Cloud Service Modification · source-mapped

DC0069 collection page — Collect the service-specific update API and resulting configuration state; record account/project, actor and changed settings.

Providers and collection configuration

  • In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.
  • Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.
  • Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies.

Required normalized fields: service, resource_id, attribute, before, after.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0069",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "service": "lab-audit-service",
    "resource_id": "lab-service-1",
    "attribute": "retention_days",
    "before": 7,
    "after": 30
  }
}

Visibility limits: AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.

Command Execution · source-mapped

DC0064 collection page — Collect process command lines and relevant shell/interpreter audit; shell history alone is neither complete nor tamper-resistant.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Enable Script Block Logging through the policy/configuration for the installed edition. Forward Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational for Windows PowerShell, or PowerShellCore/Operational for PowerShell 7.
  • Retain script-block ID and fragment ordering alongside process creation. Protect access to collected script text; secrets may be included.
  • On Linux, use narrowly scoped Audit execution rules for the lab account and supported architectures, and retain joined SYSCALL/EXECVE/PATH records.

Required normalized fields: interpreter, command_line, actor_uid, session_id.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0064",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "interpreter": "/bin/sh",
    "command_line": "printf LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK",
    "actor_uid": 1000,
    "session_id": "lab-session-1"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Script content and process command lines are different signals. Logging may be partial, fragmented, filtered or disabled; never assume a command line reveals everything executed.

Network Traffic Content · source-mapped

DC0085 collection page — Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
  • Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
  • Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
  • Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
  • Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.

Required normalized fields: flow_id, protocol, method, path, payload_excerpt.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0085",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "flow_id": "lab-flow-1",
    "protocol": "http",
    "method": "GET",
    "path": "/lab-check",
    "payload_excerpt": "LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.

Process Creation · source-mapped

DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.

<EventFiltering>
  <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
    <Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
  </ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>

This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0032",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
    "parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
    "command_line": "whoami",
    "user": "LAB\\analyst"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Service Creation · source-mapped

DC0060 collection page — Collect service-install auditing through Audit Security System Extension where supported, plus Service Control Manager/System logs and the new service configuration.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
  • For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
  • Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.

Required normalized fields: service, action, executable, actor.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0060",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "service": "LabService",
    "action": "install",
    "executable": "C:\\Lab\\service.exe",
    "actor": "lab-admin"
  }
}

Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.

User Account Authentication · source-mapped

DC0002 collection page — Collect successful and failed sign-ins, authentication method, application and conditional-access context; distinguish account validation from session creation.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Enable/export the required identity sign-in and audit categories from the lab tenant to a protected destination. Document license, role and retention requirements.
  • Correlate issuance or administrative changes with later sign-ins using non-secret credential IDs, application IDs, user IDs and correlation IDs.
  • Exclude passwords, bearer tokens, cookies and private keys. Record success, failure, authentication context and application result separately.

Required normalized fields: account, application, result, reason, source_ip.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0002",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "account": "analyst@example.test",
    "application": "lab-portal",
    "result": "failure",
    "reason": "invalid_credential",
    "source_ip": "192.0.2.10"
  }
}

Visibility limits: A token creation record is not evidence of token use; a sign-in is not a complete record of every resource access. Some provider-side data is unavailable to the customer.

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

DET0314 Detection Strategy for Network Sniffing Across Platforms

MITRE detection strategy

AN0875 Analytic 0875

Detects suspicious execution of network monitoring tools (e.g., Wireshark, tshark, Microsoft Message Analyzer), driver loading indicative of promiscuous mode, or non-admin user privilege escalation to access NICs for capture.

Platforms: Windows.

AN0876 Analytic 0876

Correlates interface mode changes to promiscuous with execution of sniffing tools like tcpdump, tshark, or custom pcap libraries. Detects abnormal NIC configurations and unauthorized sniffing from non-root sessions.

Platforms: Linux.

AN0877 Analytic 0877

Detects enabling of interface sniffing via packet capture tools or AppleScript triggering `tcpdump`. Leverages Unified Logs and process lineage to identify suspicious use of `pfctl`, `tcpdump`, or `libpcap` libraries.

Platforms: macOS.

AN0878 Analytic 0878

Detects creation of traffic mirroring sessions (e.g., AWS VPC Traffic Mirroring, Azure vTAP) that redirect traffic from critical assets to other virtual instances, often followed by file creation or session establishment.

Platforms: IaaS.

AN0879 Analytic 0879

Detects execution of capture commands via CLI (`monitor capture`, `debug packet`, etc.) or unauthorized CLI access followed by logging configuration changes on Cisco/Juniper/Arista gear.

Platforms: Network Devices.

Source rule directory and observation requirements

9 exact-tagged source rules. A source tag is a discovery aid, not a relevance verdict. Check the observation point and actual condition of each rule.

Before treating a rule as coverage

  1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
  2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
  3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
  4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1040 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

  • Cloud control plane: Per account, role, region and API: rare actions, new role-resource relationships, enumeration bursts and configuration changes. Separate deployment automation and organization-level administrative activity.
  • Script and command execution: Per host role and principal: rare interpreters, command argument patterns and parent-child sequences. Normalize scripts carefully; obfuscation, administrative automation and missing command lines change visibility.
  • Network and protocol telemetry: Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects.
  • Endpoint activity: Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity.
  • Windows and directory audit: Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance.
  • Identity and SaaS: Per identity and application: first-seen clients/resources, changes in authentication failures and session patterns, and unusual permission changes. Separate automation, travel, shared egress and identity-provider policy changes.
  1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
  2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
  3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
  4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

Software observed in source procedures

These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.

17 source-documented software associations

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: 16 compatible documented candidates. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.

Packet Capture Linux socket AF_PACKET,SOCK_RAW with sudo

Captures packets with domain=AF_PACKET, type=SOCK_RAW for a few seconds.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 10c710c9-9104-4d5f-8829-5b65391e2a29 · linux · bash.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • csource_path: Path to C program source (type string; source default PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/linux_pcapdemo.c)
  • program_path: Path to compiled C program (type string; source default /tmp/t1040_linux_pcapdemo)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • compile C program
Packet Capture Linux socket AF_INET,SOCK_PACKET,UDP with sudo

Captures packets with domain=AF_INET,type=SOCK_PACKET,protocol=UDP for a few seconds.
SOCK_PACKET is "obsolete" according to the man page, but still works on Ubuntu 20.04

Pinned Atomic procedure · 515575ab-d213-42b1-aa64-ef6a2dd4641b · linux · bash.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • csource_path: Path to C program source (type string; source default PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/linux_pcapdemo.c)
  • program_path: Path to compiled C program (type string; source default /tmp/t1040_linux_pcapdemo)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • compile C program
Packet Capture Linux socket AF_INET,SOCK_RAW,TCP with sudo

Captures packets with domain=AF_INET,type=SOCK_RAW,protocol=TCP for a few seconds.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 7a0895f0-84c1-4adf-8491-a21510b1d4c1 · linux · bash.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • csource_path: Path to C program source (type string; source default PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/linux_pcapdemo.c)
  • program_path: Path to compiled C program (type string; source default /tmp/t1040_linux_pcapdemo)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • compile C program
Packet Capture Linux using tshark or tcpdump

Perform a PCAP. Wireshark will be required for tshark. TCPdump may already be installed.

Upon successful execution, tshark or tcpdump will execute and capture 5 packets on interface ens33.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 7fe741f7-b265-4951-a7c7-320889083b3e · linux · bash.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • interface: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. (type string; source default ens33)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • Check if at least one of tcpdump or tshark is installed.
Windows Internal pktmon set filter

Select Desired ports for packet capture
https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pktmon/

Pinned Atomic procedure · 855fb8b4-b8ab-4785-ae77-09f5df7bff55 · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

PowerShell Network Sniffing

PowerShell Built-in Cmdlets to capture network traffic.
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/neteventpacketcapture/new-neteventsession?view=windowsserver2022-ps

Pinned Atomic procedure · 9c15a7de-de14-46c3-bc2a-6d94130986ae · windows · powershell.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Packet Capture macOS using tcpdump or tshark

Perform a PCAP on macOS. This will require Wireshark/tshark to be installed. TCPdump may already be installed.

Upon successful execution, tshark or tcpdump will execute and capture 5 packets on interface en0A.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 9d04efee-eff5-4240-b8d2-07792b873608 · macos · bash.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • interface: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. (type string; source default en0A)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • Check if at least one of tcpdump or tshark is installed.
Filtered Packet Capture FreeBSD using /dev/bpfN with sudo

Opens a /dev/bpf file (O_RDONLY), sets BPF filter for 'udp' and captures packets for a few seconds.

Pinned Atomic procedure · a3a0d4c9-c068-4563-a08d-583bd05b884c · linux · sh.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • ifname: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. (type string; source default em0)
  • csource_path: Path to C program source (type string; source default PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/freebsd_pcapdemo.c)
  • program_path: Path to compiled C program (type string; source default /tmp/t1040_freebsd_pcapdemo)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • compile C program
Packet Capture Windows Command Prompt

Perform a packet capture using the windows command prompt. This will require a host that has Wireshark/Tshark
installed.

Upon successful execution, tshark will execute and capture 5 packets on interface "Ethernet".

Pinned Atomic procedure · a5b2f6a0-24b4-493e-9590-c699f75723ca · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • interface: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. (type string; source default Ethernet)
  • wireshark_url: wireshark installer download URL (type url; source default https://1.eu.dl.wireshark.org/win64/Wireshark-latest-x64.exe)
  • tshark_path: path to tshark.exe (type path; source default c:\program files\wireshark\tshark.exe)
  • npcap_url: npcap installed download URL (type url; source default https://nmap.org/npcap/dist/npcap-1.31.exe)
  • npcap_path: path to npcap.sys (type path; source default C:\Program Files\Npcap\npcap.sys)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

2 prerequisite definitions:

  • tshark must be installed and in the default path of "c:\Program Files\Wireshark\Tshark.exe".
  • npcap must be installed.
Packet Capture Linux socket AF_PACKET,SOCK_RAW with BPF filter for UDP with sudo

Captures packets with domain=AF_PACKET,type=SOCK_RAW for a few seconds.
Sets a BPF filter on the socket to filter for UDP traffic.

Pinned Atomic procedure · b1cbdf8b-6078-48f5-a890-11ea19d7f8e9 · linux · bash.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • csource_path: Path to C program source (type string; source default PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/linux_pcapdemo.c)
  • program_path: Path to compiled C program (type string; source default /tmp/t1040_linux_pcapdemo)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • compile C program
Windows Internal Packet Capture

Uses the built-in Windows packet capture
After execution you should find a file named trace.etl and trace.cab in the temp directory

Pinned Atomic procedure · b5656f67-d67f-4de8-8e62-b5581630f528 · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Windows Internal pktmon capture

Will start a packet capture and store log file as t1040.etl.
https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pktmon/

Pinned Atomic procedure · c67ba807-f48b-446e-b955-e4928cd1bf91 · windows · command_prompt.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

No input arguments declared.

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

Packet Capture FreeBSD using tshark or tcpdump

Perform a PCAP. Wireshark will be required for tshark. TCPdump may already be installed.

Upon successful execution, tshark or tcpdump will execute and capture 5 packets on interface ens33.

Pinned Atomic procedure · c93f2492-9ebe-44b5-8b45-36574cccfe67 · linux · sh.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • interface: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. (type string; source default em0)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • Check if at least one of tcpdump or tshark is installed.
Packet Capture FreeBSD using /dev/bpfN with sudo

Opens a /dev/bpf file (O_RDONLY) and captures packets for a few seconds.

Pinned Atomic procedure · e2028771-1bfb-48f5-b5e6-e50ee0942a14 · linux · sh.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • ifname: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. (type string; source default em0)
  • csource_path: Path to C program source (type string; source default PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/freebsd_pcapdemo.c)
  • program_path: Path to compiled C program (type string; source default /tmp/t1040_freebsd_pcapdemo)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • compile C program
Filtered Packet Capture macOS using /dev/bpfN with sudo

Opens a /dev/bpf file (O_RDONLY), sets BPF filter for 'udp' and captures packets for a few seconds.

Pinned Atomic procedure · e2480aee-23f3-4f34-80ce-de221e27cd19 · macos · bash.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • ifname: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. (type string; source default en0)
  • csource_path: Path to C program source (type string; source default PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/macos_pcapdemo.c)
  • program_path: Path to compiled C program (type string; source default /tmp/t1040_macos_pcapdemo)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • compile C program
Packet Capture macOS using /dev/bpfN with sudo

Opens a /dev/bpf file (O_RDONLY) and captures packets for a few seconds.

Pinned Atomic procedure · e6fe5095-545d-4c8b-a0ae-e863914be3aa · macos · bash.

Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • ifname: Specify interface to perform PCAP on. (type string; source default en0)
  • csource_path: Path to C program source (type string; source default PathToAtomicsFolder/T1040/src/macos_pcapdemo.c)
  • program_path: Path to compiled C program (type string; source default /tmp/t1040_macos_pcapdemo)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

1 prerequisite definitions:

  • compile C program

Technique-specific experiment contract

  1. Choose one procedure implementing T1040 Network Sniffing; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
  2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
  3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
  4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
  5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Network Sniffing, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

Source-linked mitigations

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

enterprisecloudcloud-hosted-endpointnetwork-infrastructureonpremIaaSLinuxmacOSNetwork DevicesWindowscredential-accessdiscoveryisolated_authorized_labprocedure_review_requiredtelemetry_configuration_requireddisposable_tenant_and_cost_controlssome_candidates_require_elevation
Atomic candidate documentedtechniquesource_mapped

Source procedure platform / method / executor tags:

linuxautomatedbashwindowscommand_promptpowershellmacossh

Detection and collection

T1040 detection workspace

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Connected anomaly research

Curated research views reached through an exact source technique, a catalog model, or a reviewed collection reference. These are navigation associations, not claims of detector effectiveness or sensor equivalence.

Telemetry contracts · Maintained query examples · Validation and blind spots

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.