1200KM / simulation
T1027.002 Software Packing — Attack Simulation
Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format…
Technique description
Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format…
At least one platform-compatible Atomic procedure is documented. Individual review, lab prerequisites, and validation remain required.
Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models
Documented simulation candidates
- Binary simply packed by UPX (linux)
Procedure 11c46cd8-e471-450e-acb8-52a1216ae6a4; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Binary packed by UPX, with modified headers
Procedure 4d46e16b-5765-4046-9f25-a600d3e65e4d; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Binary simply packed by UPX
Procedure b16ef901-00bb-4dda-b4fc-a04db5067e20; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Binary packed by UPX, with modified headers (linux)
Procedure f06197f8-ff46-48c2-a0c6-afc1b50665e1; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Detection and collection
Attack tools
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
- APT29 · G0016
- APT3 · G0022
- Threat Group-3390 · G0027
- Patchwork · G0040
- Elderwood · G0066
- Dark Caracal · G0070
- APT38 · G0082
- APT39 · G0087
- The White Company · G0089
- TA505 · G0092
- GALLIUM · G0093
- Kimsuky · G0094
- APT41 · G0096
- Rocke · G0106
- ZIRCONIUM · G0128
- TeamTNT · G0139
- Aoqin Dragon · G1007
- Volt Typhoon · G1017
- TA2541 · G1018
- MoustachedBouncer · G1019
- Saint Bear · G1031
- Medusa Group · G1051
- Storm-0501 · G1053
Existing research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.