1200KM / sigma-rule
Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp - PowerShell Module — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule daf7eb81-35fd-410d-9d7a-657837e602bb. Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp - PowerShell Module — Sigma Rule. Detects PowerShell scripts that make use of the "Compress-Archive" Cmdlet in order to compress folders and files where the output is stored in a potentially suspicious location that is used often by malware for exfiltration. An adversary might compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2021-07-20 / 2023-12-18.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "ps_module",
"definition": "0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 009ea69dcd4df93eb93374f52f056a135aad72e35c67b76c0915299628999999
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp - PowerShell Module
id: daf7eb81-35fd-410d-9d7a-657837e602bb # PowerShell Module
related:
- id: 71ff406e-b633-4989-96ec-bc49d825a412 # PowerShell Classic
type: similar
- id: b7a3c9a3-09ea-4934-8864-6a32cacd98d9 # PowerShell Script
type: similar
- id: 85a8e5ba-bd03-4bfb-bbfa-a4409a8f8b98 # Process Creation
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects PowerShell scripts that make use of the "Compress-Archive" Cmdlet in order to compress folders and files where the output is stored in a potentially suspicious location that is used often by malware for exfiltration.
An adversary might compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.md
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2021-07-20
modified: 2023-12-18
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.t1074.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_module
definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b
detection:
selection:
ContextInfo|contains|all:
- 'Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath $env:TEMP'
- 'Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath*\AppData\Local\Temp\'
- 'Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath*:\Windows\Temp\'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.