- S0012 PoisonIvy — malware.
PoisonIvy stages collected data in a text file.[Symantec Darkmoon Aug 2005]
Exact relationship: relationship--7d8e5c4d-afdb-43f9-bfcf-7ed674a516e3 - S0013 PlugX — malware.
PlugX has collected and staged the victim’s computer files for exfiltration.[DOJ Affidavit Search and Seizure PlugX December 2024]
Exact relationship: relationship--83ea392a-3959-4b29-b7b8-517a20ec836d - S0024 Dyre — malware.
Dyre has the ability to create files in a TEMP folder to act as a database to store information.[Malwarebytes Dyreza November 2015]
Exact relationship: relationship--2d82c7df-baa0-4268-855d-03df92fa35ab - S0035 SPACESHIP — malware.
SPACESHIP identifies files with certain extensions and copies them to a directory in the user's profile.[FireEye APT30]
Exact relationship: relationship--9e214d5b-7d46-4135-bc42-4caab16b39d8 - S0036 FLASHFLOOD — malware.
FLASHFLOOD stages data it copies from the local system or removable drives in the "%WINDIR%\$NtUninstallKB885884$\" directory.[FireEye APT30]
Exact relationship: relationship--e5728c4d-d404-44e8-9e28-3411942c5234 - S0038 Duqu — malware.
Modules can be pushed to and executed by Duqu that copy data to a staging area, compress it, and XOR encrypt it.[Symantec W32.Duqu]
Exact relationship: relationship--611cb6eb-efdb-4d74-b354-5064ab52bd34 - S0045 ADVSTORESHELL — malware.
ADVSTORESHELL stores output from command execution in a .dat file in the %TEMP% directory.[ESET Sednit Part 2]
Exact relationship: relationship--5d397a8d-2195-440d-a0f5-bbf6c3e8f6e4 - S0062 DustySky — malware.
DustySky created folders in temp directories to host collected files before exfiltration.[Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019]
Exact relationship: relationship--7e7c0aa8-a17e-4079-b1fd-188977cf1a6e - S0081 Elise — malware.
Elise creates a file in <code>AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer</code> and stores all harvested data in that file.[Accenture Dragonfish Jan 2018]
Exact relationship: relationship--9e77c6fc-0227-42d6-b4ce-f228115963fe - S0084 Mis-Type — malware.
Mis-Type has temporarily stored collected information to the files `“%AppData%\{Unique Identifier}\HOSTRURKLSR”` and `“%AppData%\{Unique Identifier}\NEWERSSEMP”`.[Cylance Dust Storm]
Exact relationship: relationship--e08fbaf9-0efe-41b1-99f7-ec61f38b175c - S0090 Rover — malware.
Rover copies files from removable drives to <code>C:\system</code>.[Palo Alto Rover]
Exact relationship: relationship--9cef6fec-e4eb-49eb-85db-880138f335bd - S0094 Trojan.Karagany — malware.
Trojan.Karagany can create directories to store plugin output and stage data for exfiltration.[Symantec Dragonfly][Secureworks Karagany July 2019]
Exact relationship: relationship--7cf7d162-a34f-4951-a643-5bf959283f6b - S0113 Prikormka — malware.
Prikormka creates a directory, <code>%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Local\SKC\</code>, which is used to store collected log files.[ESET Operation Groundbait]
Exact relationship: relationship--df207207-01b2-456b-9dc4-7afd5ffeeb46 - S0128 BADNEWS — malware.
BADNEWS copies documents under 15MB found on the victim system to is the user's <code>%temp%\SMB\</code> folder. It also copies files from USB devices to a predefined directory.[Forcepoint Monsoon][TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017]
Exact relationship: relationship--db8f1355-57f0-446d-a261-b168497b20c6 - S0136 USBStealer — malware.
USBStealer collects files matching certain criteria from the victim and stores them in a local directory for later exfiltration.[ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014][Kaspersky Sofacy]
Exact relationship: relationship--fe229513-0cd9-4e9a-a333-2748ef03dfbc - S0147 Pteranodon — malware.
Pteranodon creates various subdirectories under <code>%Temp%\reports\%</code> and copies files to those subdirectories. It also creates a folder at <code>C:\Users\<Username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\store</code> to store screenshot JPEG files.[Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017]
Exact relationship: relationship--c93bb2b9-bd22-4e14-b884-2141168387b2 - S0149 MoonWind — malware.
MoonWind saves information from its keylogging routine as a .zip file in the present working directory.[Palo Alto MoonWind March 2017]
Exact relationship: relationship--9c4a8336-5f5f-4e58-b00d-b6bf1c59ec03 - S0169 RawPOS — malware.
Data captured by RawPOS is placed in a temporary file under a directory named "memdump".[Kroll RawPOS Jan 2017]
Exact relationship: relationship--b25f5d90-f6cc-47e9-89f1-5527886bf536 - S0170 Helminth — malware.
Helminth creates folders to store output from batch scripts prior to sending the information to its C2 server.[Palo Alto OilRig May 2016]
Exact relationship: relationship--9c7ecbf4-88fe-4144-8dc4-f5bca2c3156d - S0196 PUNCHBUGGY — malware.
PUNCHBUGGY has saved information to a random temp file before exfil.[Morphisec ShellTea June 2019]
Exact relationship: relationship--992d6f04-7454-4211-9a44-a5c87fdb7657 - S0197 PUNCHTRACK — malware.
PUNCHTRACK aggregates collected data in a tmp file.[FireEye Know Your Enemy FIN8 Aug 2016]
Exact relationship: relationship--f38ae08a-0d59-41e9-a4ca-891a04297299 - S0198 NETWIRE — malware.
NETWIRE has the ability to write collected data to a file created in the <code>./LOGS</code> directory.[FireEye NETWIRE March 2019]
Exact relationship: relationship--e5562f3f-9657-49e8-8243-b5aff51e18a4 - S0247 NavRAT — malware.
NavRAT writes multiple outputs to a TMP file using the >> method.[Talos NavRAT May 2018]
Exact relationship: relationship--1784577e-9d82-497b-aba1-bc4d5a23d8f8 - S0249 Gold Dragon — malware.
Gold Dragon stores information gathered from the endpoint in a file named 1.hwp.[McAfee Gold Dragon]
Exact relationship: relationship--74edb7f4-4c3b-4573-abb0-c4842032b6c3 - S0251 Zebrocy — malware.
Zebrocy stores all collected information in a single file before exfiltration.[ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018]
Exact relationship: relationship--c4a2a14a-6fb0-46cf-b97d-c4bcb1c751a7 - S0260 InvisiMole — malware.
InvisiMole determines a working directory where it stores all the gathered data about the compromised machine.[ESET InvisiMole June 2018][ESET InvisiMole June 2020]
Exact relationship: relationship--59193fff-6bea-41c6-b744-36850e6cc39a - S0261 Catchamas — malware.
Catchamas stores the gathered data from the machine in .db files and .bmp files under four separate locations.[Symantec Catchamas April 2018]
Exact relationship: relationship--ad77932b-9632-4816-b9af-db6257f5a7d4 - S0264 OopsIE — malware.
OopsIE stages the output from command execution and collected files in specific folders before exfiltration.[Unit 42 OopsIE! Feb 2018]
Exact relationship: relationship--0634c754-9660-414f-8304-d9d92e37a0ce - S0265 Kazuar — malware.
Kazuar stages command output and collected data in files before exfiltration.[Unit 42 Kazuar May 2017]
Exact relationship: relationship--df48ab06-0916-4d1d-9142-d0a508d0f0d4 - S0274 Calisto — malware.
Calisto uses a hidden directory named .calisto to store data from the victim’s machine before exfiltration.[Securelist Calisto July 2018][Symantec Calisto July 2018]
Exact relationship: relationship--dbdf85ca-504d-40f9-9023-ce8acdf99781 - S0335 Carbon — malware.
Carbon creates a base directory that contains the files and folders that are collected.[ESET Carbon Mar 2017]
Exact relationship: relationship--487cc105-dd80-4b43-94ae-da23517aab6f - S0337 BadPatch — malware.
BadPatch stores collected data in log files before exfiltration.[Unit 42 BadPatch Oct 2017]
Exact relationship: relationship--330e86f3-f4ff-4fe0-af64-cd3c86849239 - S0340 Octopus — malware.
Octopus has stored collected information in the Application Data directory on a compromised host.[Securelist Octopus Oct 2018][ESET Nomadic Octopus 2018]
Exact relationship: relationship--97ffb5c1-05da-42b4-90eb-60c1eedc1292 - S0343 Exaramel for Windows — malware.
Exaramel for Windows specifies a path to store files scheduled for exfiltration.[ESET TeleBots Oct 2018]
Exact relationship: relationship--ce4321e0-09e0-4e3a-b673-8a6e9248e720 - S0353 NOKKI — malware.
NOKKI can collect data from the victim and stage it in <code>LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\uplog.tmp</code>.[Unit 42 NOKKI Sept 2018]
Exact relationship: relationship--c7c855ed-9550-4611-84bd-d4d7c86cef3c - S0373 Astaroth — malware.
Astaroth collects data in a plaintext file named r1.log before exfiltration. [Cofense Astaroth Sept 2018]
Exact relationship: relationship--f26e1997-733e-4c3c-ac26-294048466c52 - S0386 Ursnif — malware.
Ursnif has used tmp files to stage gathered information.[TrendMicro Ursnif Mar 2015]
Exact relationship: relationship--1e46f5cf-dfaf-4cc6-a685-ee876f371b7e - S0395 LightNeuron — malware.
LightNeuron can store email data in files and directories specified in its configuration, such as <code>C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\appdata\Local\Temp\</code>.[ESET LightNeuron May 2019]
Exact relationship: relationship--87999cb2-7565-465a-ad10-b585be2e3e3f - S0409 Machete — malware.
Machete stores files and logs in a folder on the local drive.[ESET Machete July 2019][Cylance Machete Mar 2017]
Exact relationship: relationship--79333543-6031-4aa4-91be-35d80fae8ed2 - S0438 Attor — malware.
Attor has staged collected data in a central upload directory prior to exfiltration.[ESET Attor Oct 2019]
Exact relationship: relationship--6376c6be-5ec7-4775-8984-13a1474dc92d - S0443 MESSAGETAP — malware.
MESSAGETAP stored targeted SMS messages that matched its target list in CSV files on the compromised system.[FireEye MESSAGETAP October 2019]
Exact relationship: relationship--aa12e2a6-02e7-4001-af7b-6a60021ddbfd - S0458 Ramsay — malware.
Ramsay can stage data prior to exfiltration in <code>%APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSetting</code> and <code>%APPDATA%\Microsoft\UserSetting\MediaCache</code>.[Eset Ramsay May 2020][Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020]
Exact relationship: relationship--4b03f718-f89a-4652-b3be-5cbe4e0e044f - S0503 FrameworkPOS — malware.
FrameworkPOS can identifiy payment card track data on the victim and copy it to a local file in a subdirectory of C:\Windows\.[FireEye FIN6 April 2016]
Exact relationship: relationship--935d1918-a1ea-4c46-b3b0-5c1d0f44a346 - S0526 KGH_SPY — malware.
KGH_SPY can save collected system information to a file named "info" before exfiltration.[Cybereason Kimsuky November 2020]
Exact relationship: relationship--dcd2acb8-0f4a-4007-88ec-0962d66399cf - S0538 Crutch — malware.
Crutch has staged stolen files in the <code>C:\AMD\Temp</code> directory.[ESET Crutch December 2020]
Exact relationship: relationship--dd45bff3-368a-4a3b-a97e-8bdeb753aedf - S0567 Dtrack — malware.
Dtrack can save collected data to disk, different file formats, and network shares.[Securelist Dtrack][CyberBit Dtrack]
Exact relationship: relationship--118d9413-0b34-47e6-b333-b712e78dc404 - S0593 ECCENTRICBANDWAGON — malware.
ECCENTRICBANDWAGON has stored keystrokes and screenshots within the <code>%temp%\GoogleChrome</code>, <code>%temp%\Downloads</code>, and <code>%temp%\TrendMicroUpdate</code> directories.[CISA EB Aug 2020]
Exact relationship: relationship--f8c1f1e4-4580-4ec6-9bc0-6f24214dc273 - S0615 SombRAT — malware.
SombRAT can store harvested data in a custom database under the %TEMP% directory.[BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020]
Exact relationship: relationship--a30e2e98-d6c2-4eb1-b520-1b6757c88c47 - S0622 AppleSeed — malware.
AppleSeed can stage files in a central location prior to exfiltration.[Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021]
Exact relationship: relationship--d747c1d7-646a-4d72-a00b-e2f10ed1f9eb - S0629 RainyDay — malware.
RainyDay can use a file exfiltration tool to copy files to <code>C:\ProgramData\Adobe\temp</code> prior to exfiltration.[Bitdefender Naikon April 2021]
Exact relationship: relationship--6b9d6a84-b73e-4fb3-ad86-64b5832056d4 - S0644 ObliqueRAT — malware.
ObliqueRAT can copy specific files, webcam captures, and screenshots to local directories.[Talos Oblique RAT March 2021]
Exact relationship: relationship--bb6be5dd-602d-4625-859a-eb6c5bddc29c - S0647 Turian — malware.
Turian can store copied files in a specific directory prior to exfiltration.[ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021]
Exact relationship: relationship--b30daf73-f565-4c1e-bc0b-77bb1c22b03f - S0650 QakBot — malware.
QakBot has stored stolen emails and other data into new folders prior to exfiltration.[Kroll Qakbot June 2020]
Exact relationship: relationship--910d0f07-383b-480b-9637-d5b747353bdc - S0651 BoxCaon — malware.
BoxCaon has created a working folder for collected files that it sends to the C2 server.[Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021]
Exact relationship: relationship--e27daa6c-3577-4f58-9440-7a585e9571d9 - S0652 MarkiRAT — malware.
MarkiRAT can store collected data locally in a created .nfo file.[Kaspersky Ferocious Kitten Jun 2021]
Exact relationship: relationship--c7d7c454-71fb-4a8e-989a-cb2e7404c0d3 - S0667 Chrommme — malware.
Chrommme can store captured system information locally prior to exfiltration.[ESET Gelsemium June 2021]
Exact relationship: relationship--5fd8740a-6197-4099-a4d9-af0c9421cfc2 - S0673 DarkWatchman — malware.
DarkWatchman can stage local data in the Windows Registry.[Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021]
Exact relationship: relationship--343c6e94-fda1-41d6-865e-6a30570afb98 - S1012 PowerLess — malware.
PowerLess can stage stolen browser data in `C:\\Windows\\Temp\\cup.tmp` and keylogger data in `C:\\Windows\\Temp\\Report.06E17A5A-7325-4325-8E5D-E172EBA7FC5BK`.[Cybereason PowerLess February 2022]
Exact relationship: relationship--87aaf244-2ecb-453e-87c0-836f9a26cc59 - S1015 Milan — malware.
Milan has saved files prior to upload from a compromised host to folders beginning with the characters `a9850d2f`.[ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021]
Exact relationship: relationship--13e52bdf-aa82-4220-8a02-02c735c4fccf - S1016 MacMa — malware.
MacMa has stored collected files locally before exfiltration.[Objective-See MacMa Nov 2021]
Exact relationship: relationship--44a77efc-9215-4e5a-a246-ac9669dc52a4 - S1029 AuTo Stealer — malware.
AuTo Stealer can store collected data from an infected host to a file named `Hostname_UserName.txt` prior to exfiltration.[MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021]
Exact relationship: relationship--066425f1-79cb-4cbc-b570-0280ac503c55 - S1037 STARWHALE — malware.
STARWHALE has stored collected data in a file called `stari.txt`.[Mandiant UNC3313 Feb 2022]
Exact relationship: relationship--f2d62173-bd89-4d00-bcb6-5e4f6fa43df2 - S1042 SUGARDUMP — malware.
SUGARDUMP has stored collected data under `%<malware_execution_folder>%\\CrashLog.txt`.[Mandiant UNC3890 Aug 2022]
Exact relationship: relationship--5b4d7467-8418-42c8-bb6f-ad275fc7fb40 - S1043 ccf32 — malware.
ccf32 can temporarily store files in a hidden directory on the local host.[Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020]
Exact relationship: relationship--966ce7a3-4306-4003-89d8-9d6af89a0c2e - S1044 FunnyDream — malware.
FunnyDream can stage collected information including screen captures and logged keystrokes locally.[Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020]
Exact relationship: relationship--20b14e6f-685d-4b88-9ab7-40f7beb99ec4 - S1059 metaMain — malware.
metaMain has stored the collected system files in a working directory.[SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022][SentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022]
Exact relationship: relationship--4126e124-fb28-4274-a687-dc5344b34859 - S1060 Mafalda — malware.
Mafalda can place retrieved files into a destination directory.[SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022]
Exact relationship: relationship--421fd048-a5c3-46b0-b1ff-a7510c107879 - S1075 KOPILUWAK — malware.
KOPILUWAK has piped the results from executed C2 commands to `%TEMP%\result2.dat` on the local machine.[Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023]
Exact relationship: relationship--ef651fd2-97e7-4471-a609-41f46003cf11 - S1090 NightClub — malware.
NightClub has copied captured files and keystrokes to the `%TEMP%` directory of compromised hosts.[MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023]
Exact relationship: relationship--d8c447e8-6581-47ca-98d6-44b262023669 - S1101 LoFiSe — malware.
LoFiSe can save files to be evaluated for further exfiltration in the `C:\Programdata\Microsoft\` and `C:\windows\temp\` folders.
[Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023]
Exact relationship: relationship--959bda8e-6c64-4048-9c34-f8ccd64066e8 - S1104 SLOWPULSE — malware.
SLOWPULSE can write logged ACE credentials to `/home/perl/PAUS.pm` in append mode, using the format string `%s:%s\n`.[Mandiant Pulse Secure Zero-Day April 2021]
Exact relationship: relationship--830b0685-3b30-4c7b-9b37-2fca346e6fc8 - S1109 PACEMAKER — malware.
PACEMAKER has written extracted data to `tmp/dsserver-check.statementcounters`.[Mandiant Pulse Secure Zero-Day April 2021]
Exact relationship: relationship--fc9b992b-d38d-46f5-84b5-13c0e116a717 - S1110 SLIGHTPULSE — malware.
SLIGHTPULSE has piped the output from executed commands to `/tmp/1`.[Mandiant Pulse Secure Zero-Day April 2021]
Exact relationship: relationship--0f578b99-3d14-4416-8936-51e11d71a47b - S1124 SocGholish — malware.
SocGholish can send output from `whoami` to a local temp file using the naming convention `rad<5-hex-chars>.tmp`.[Red Canary SocGholish March 2024]
Exact relationship: relationship--e0fdf36c-02e5-4100-b0f2-a1fb28fdd674 - S1142 LunarMail — malware.
LunarMail can create a directory in `%TEMP%\` to stage data prior to exfilration.[ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024]
Exact relationship: relationship--fca5e5e4-e615-44d5-901e-225fccd329cc - S1149 CHIMNEYSWEEP — malware.
CHIMNEYSWEEP can store captured screenshots to disk including to a covert store named `APPX.%x%x%x%x%x.tmp` where `%x` is a random value.[Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022]
Exact relationship: relationship--0764c8ee-8577-4124-9658-7cc90f74726f - S1153 Cuckoo Stealer — malware.
Cuckoo Stealer has staged collected application data from Safari, Notes, and Keychain to `/var/folder`.[Kandji Cuckoo April 2024]
Exact relationship: relationship--58643a55-d526-4536-935c-5c1b5c1d9b20 - S1154 VersaMem — malware.
VersaMem staged captured credentials locally at `/tmp/.temp.data`.[Lumen Versa 2024]
Exact relationship: relationship--e86b2094-65ea-45f8-94cc-0467cf2eebd9 - S1168 SampleCheck5000 — malware.
SampleCheck5000 can log the output from C2 commands in an encrypted and compressed format on disk prior to exfiltration.[ESET OilRig Downloaders DEC 2023]
Exact relationship: relationship--b4e0328b-5ddb-4322-a8db-e736648eab22 - S1172 OilBooster — malware.
OilBooster can stage files in the `tempFiles` directory for exfiltration.[ESET OilRig Downloaders DEC 2023]
Exact relationship: relationship--db4032d6-1283-4e1e-a506-110a8600083f - S1196 Troll Stealer — malware.
Troll Stealer encrypts gathered information on victim devices prior to exfiltrating it through command and control infrastructure.[S2W Troll Stealer 2024]
Exact relationship: relationship--11fdff9c-078b-48f6-ac6c-4a2c89dafc4f - S1210 Sagerunex — malware.
Sagerunex gathers host information and stages it locally as a RAR file prior to exfiltration.[Cisco LotusBlossom 2025] Sagerunex stores logged data in an encrypted file located at `%TEMP%/TS_FB56.tmp` during execution.[Symantec Bilbug 2022]
Exact relationship: relationship--c66dddb1-0003-4af8-9887-5642964e0fd0 - S1213 Lumma Stealer — malware.
Lumma Stealer has configured a custom user data directory such as a folder within `%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming` for staging data.[TrendMicro LummaStealer 2025]
Exact relationship: relationship--8c9728bd-f58c-4a78-8b4d-63e8fe8cce31 - S1222 RIFLESPINE — malware.
RIFLESPINE can stage the output from executed C2 commands to a temporary file.[Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024]
Exact relationship: relationship--e43c3765-10e6-40f4-b318-39ee3f34819e - S1233 PAKLOG — malware.
PAKLOG has stored the captured data in a file located `C:\\Users\\Public\\Libraries\\record.txt`.[Zscaler PAKLOG CorkLog SplatCloak Splatdropper April 2025]
Exact relationship: relationship--be20956b-6103-4bfc-a7c4-7e61cbc8cbcd - S1235 CorKLOG — malware.
CorKLOG has stored the captured data in an encrypted file using a 48-character RC4 key.[Zscaler PAKLOG CorkLog SplatCloak Splatdropper April 2025]
Exact relationship: relationship--ca413f1f-3a42-48f5-b282-425bf3c24b22 - S1245 InvisibleFerret — malware.
InvisibleFerret has staged data in consolidated folders prior to exfiltration.[ESET Contagious Interview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret February 2025]
Exact relationship: relationship--cf1a3f3b-cfe6-4eef-b7eb-d0d4adc0187d - S1246 BeaverTail — malware.
BeaverTail has staged collected data to the system’s temporary directory.[Socket BeaverTail XORIndex HexEval Contagious Interview July 2025]
Exact relationship: relationship--6d657d75-9718-43a8-985e-44d47d1b1d15 - S9010 GlassWorm — malware.
GlassWorm has staged collected data in a working directory within a temp folder to include `/tmp/ijewf`.[Koi Glassworm New Tricks December 2025][Socket GlassWorm January 2026]
Exact relationship: relationship--66773d13-7e97-493f-a1b6-9484c52cc6a1 - S9013 DRYHOOK — malware.
DRYHOOK has stored stolen credentials for future use in the temp folder of a victimized Ivanti Connect Secure VPN device, specifically in the file location `/tmp/cmmmap.kumMW`.[Google UNC5221 Ivanti January 2025][Picus Security UNC5221 Ivanti May 2025]
Exact relationship: relationship--648c423a-ac35-411d-8ace-59b511e10fb3 - S9020 LODEINFO — malware.
LODEINFO has collected stolen web cookies locally in the `%TEMP%` folder.[ESET MirrorFace DEC 2022]
Exact relationship: relationship--23a9b432-2d25-45a7-b75f-7496b26702f8 - S9022 MirrorStealer — malware.
MirrorStealer has stored stolen credentials on the local machine in `%TEMP%\31558.txt`.[ESET MirrorFace DEC 2022]
Exact relationship: relationship--95ebe979-ec88-489d-ba9d-b4ac2f1f22db - S9035 LAMEHUG — malware.
LAMEHUG can save collected data and files of interest in `C:\ProgramData\info\` to consolidate for exfiltration.[Splunk LAMEHUG SEP 2025][Nov AI Threat Tracker]
Exact relationship: relationship--c469874c-492d-4975-abc1-1668fc65a70a - S9036 LP-Notes — malware.
LP-Notes has stored collected credentials in ` C:\Users\Public\Downloads\lp-notes.txt`.[ESET_MuddyWater_Dec2025]
Exact relationship: relationship--42ca6477-eae6-4423-8153-a1e0662f3fe5 - S9041 TeamPCP Cloud Stealer — malware.
TeamPCP Cloud Stealer has created a staging file in `/tmp` for collected data.[Wiz TeamPCP KICS MAR 2026]
Exact relationship: relationship--ff1a526c-156a-410c-bd80-f8e2f86b6c3a - S9050 Vidar — malware.
Vidar has compiled collected data into a randomly generated directory in the ProgramData folder.[Cyfirma_Vidar_June2024][Logpoint_StealerMalwareFamilies_2024]
Exact relationship: relationship--aa99d075-7455-49bb-badb-6300ffe9265f - S9051 The Gentlemen Ransomware — malware.
The Gentlemen Ransomware has copied malware executables, such as PsExec.exe, to the local `C:\Temp` directory.[MSTI_GentelmenRansomware_May2026][CheckPointResearch_TheGentlemen_April2026][CarveyODonnellWelchHuntress_TheGentlemen_May2026] The Gentlemen Ransomware had also enabled a hidden SMB share pointed at the `C:\Temp` folder to allow anonymous access.[MSTI_GentelmenRansomware_May2026][CheckPointResearch_TheGentlemen_April2026] The Gentlemen Ransomware has also consolidated data in `C:\ProgramData\data\`.[TrendAI_TheGentlemen_Sept2025]
Exact relationship: relationship--a370ba06-f0e0-49e7-a1dd-508700403bed - S9052 MiniFast — malware.
MiniFast has the ability to move data within the victim machine.[CheckPoint_NimbusManticore_May2026]
Exact relationship: relationship--d24d1525-3136-4810-a346-cd29a15dfac8 - S9053 MiniJunk — malware.
MiniJunk has the ability to move or rename files.[CheckPoint_NimbusManticoreEurope_Sept2025]
Exact relationship: relationship--766eaed1-a26a-4065-8793-17df813e9996 - S9058 SIGHTGRAB — malware.
SIGHTGRAB has saved captured screenshots of victim devices to `C:\Users\Public` prior to exfiltration.[Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025]
Exact relationship: relationship--c2fd10bb-db6f-4ea0-b63e-583c45eec56a - S9064 TRUSTTRAP — malware.
TRUSTTRAP has saved stolen credentials in a cleartext file.[Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025]
Exact relationship: relationship--b36109ad-fa2c-4e63-9460-1250053ae821 - S9065 DCSYNCER.SLICK — malware.
DCSYNCER.SLICK has staged stolen credentials in hard-coded local device paths to include `C:\Program Files\VMware\` and `C:\users\public\`.[Mandiant_UNC1549_Nov2025]
Exact relationship: relationship--cf3bdeb7-2728-4bae-a790-6aa2dbf766e8