1200KM / sigma-rule
Suspicious Autorun Registry Modified via WMI — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule c80e66d8-1780-48a9-b412-46663fd21ac0. Suspicious Autorun Registry Modified via WMI — Sigma Rule. Detects suspicious activity where the WMIC process is used to create an autorun registry entry via reg.exe, which is often indicative of persistence mechanisms employed by malware.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems). Source status: experimental; severity: high. Source dates: 2025-02-17 / not supplied.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: c03338b3d2833ccad1f00f31952dc29f8c7571b26c73a44fdde62fb93938577c
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Suspicious Autorun Registry Modified via WMI
id: c80e66d8-1780-48a9-b412-46663fd21ac0
status: experimental
description: |
Detects suspicious activity where the WMIC process is used to create an autorun registry entry via reg.exe, which is often indicative of persistence mechanisms employed by malware.
references:
- Internal Research
- https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-02-17
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1547.001
- attack.t1047
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_execution_img:
- Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe' # wmic process call create 'reg.exe add HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v Desktops /t REG_SZ /d "\"C:\Users\user\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\tre\Desktops.exe\" random" /f'
- ParentImage|endswith: '\wmiprvse.exe'
selection_execution_cmd:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'reg'
- ' add '
CommandLine|contains:
- '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
- '\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
- '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run'
selection_suspicious_paths_1:
CommandLine|contains:
- ':\Perflogs'
- :\ProgramData'
- ':\Windows\Temp'
- ':\Temp'
- '\AppData\Local\Temp'
- '\AppData\Roaming'
- ':\$Recycle.bin'
- ':\Users\Default'
- ':\Users\public'
- '%temp%'
- '%tmp%'
- '%Public%'
- '%AppData%'
selection_suspicious_paths_user_1:
CommandLine|contains: ':\Users\'
selection_suspicious_paths_user_2:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\Favorites'
- '\Favourites'
- '\Contacts'
- '\Music'
- '\Pictures'
- '\Documents'
- '\Photos'
condition: all of selection_execution_* and (selection_suspicious_paths_1 or (all of selection_suspicious_paths_user_*))
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative activity or software installations
level: high
False positives
- Legitimate administrative activity or software installations
Source references
- Internal Research (source note; no public URL supplied)
- https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.