1200KM / sigma-rule
Registry Modification for OCI DLL Redirection — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule c0e0bdec-3e3d-47aa-9974-05539c999c89. Registry Modification for OCI DLL Redirection — Sigma Rule. Detects registry modifications related to 'OracleOciLib' and 'OracleOciLibPath' under 'MSDTC' settings. Threat actors may modify these registry keys to redirect the loading of 'oci.dll' to a malicious DLL, facilitating phantom DLL hijacking via the MSDTC service.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems). Source status: experimental; severity: high. Source dates: 2026-01-24 / not supplied.
{
"category": "registry_set",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: e2c3187e37e750b09c5133b325408456aac7beffe32dce557a7fafbc102076a6
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Registry Modification for OCI DLL Redirection
id: c0e0bdec-3e3d-47aa-9974-05539c999c89
status: experimental
description: |
Detects registry modifications related to 'OracleOciLib' and 'OracleOciLibPath' under 'MSDTC' settings.
Threat actors may modify these registry keys to redirect the loading of 'oci.dll' to a malicious DLL, facilitating phantom DLL hijacking via the MSDTC service.
references:
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/4-ways-adversaries-hijack-dlls/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-01-24
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1112
- attack.t1574.001
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection_ocilib:
TargetObject|endswith: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSDTC\MTxOCI\OracleOciLib'
filter_main_ocilib_file:
# it is looking when oci.dll name is changed to something else like evil.dll
Details|contains: 'oci.dll'
selection_ocilibpath:
TargetObject|endswith: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSDTC\MTxOCI\OracleOciLibPath'
filter_main_ocilibpath:
# it is looking when oci.dll path is changed to something else like 'C:\Windows\Temp\'
Details|contains: '%SystemRoot%\System32\'
condition: (selection_ocilib and not filter_main_ocilib_file) or (selection_ocilibpath and not filter_main_ocilibpath)
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
False positives
- Unlikely
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.