1200KM / sigma-rule
Registry Enumeration via WMI Stdregprov — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule a0e417e2-2fa1-40da-b6d2-e094cd5e1191. Registry Enumeration via WMI Stdregprov — Sigma Rule. Detects the usage of wmic.exe to enumerate or read Windows registry via the WMI StdRegProv class read methods (EnumKey, EnumValues, GetStringValue, etc.). While registry reads are common, attackers may use this technique to perform reconnaissance and discover sensitive configuration values, credentials, or installed software. The use of WMI as an alternative to standard tools like reg.exe can indicate an attempt to evade detection focused on traditional registry query commands.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems). Source status: experimental; severity: medium. Source dates: 2025-07-30 / 2026-06-19.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 8c0d679efb7eca9d1c5c80f7a9ead122560916eaba969a18320dd10509838690
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Registry Enumeration via WMI Stdregprov
id: a0e417e2-2fa1-40da-b6d2-e094cd5e1191
related:
- id: c453ab7a-1f5c-4716-a3b4-dea8135fb43a # Registry Manipulation via WMI Stdregprov
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the usage of wmic.exe to enumerate or read Windows registry via the WMI StdRegProv class read methods (EnumKey, EnumValues, GetStringValue, etc.).
While registry reads are common, attackers may use this technique to perform reconnaissance and discover sensitive configuration values, credentials, or installed software.
The use of WMI as an alternative to standard tools like reg.exe can indicate an attempt to evade detection focused on traditional registry query commands.
references:
- https://trustedsec.com/blog/command-line-underdog-wmic-in-action
- https://trustedsec.com/blog/wmi-for-script-kiddies
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/desktop/regprov/stdregprov
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-07-30
modified: 2026-06-19
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1012
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img: # Example command simulated: WMIC /NameSpace:\\root\default Class StdRegProv Call EnumKey hDefKey=&H80000002 sSubKeyName="Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall"
- Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'stdregprov'
- 'call'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'CheckAccess'
- 'EnumKey'
- 'EnumValues'
- 'GetBinaryValue'
- 'GetDWORDValue'
- 'GetExpandedStringValue'
- 'GetMultiStringValue'
- 'GetQWORDValue'
- 'GetSecurityDescriptor'
- 'GetStringValue'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative activity
level: medium
False positives
- Legitimate administrative activity
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.