Potential Process Execution Proxy Via CL_Invocation.ps1 — Sigma Rule

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2020-10-14 / 2023-08-17.

{
  "category": "process_creation",
  "product": "windows"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 1197578f16f899ad01565388e88b6c2823c687a50cf9a99e336a3d98a81c57c2

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: Potential Process Execution Proxy Via CL_Invocation.ps1
id: a0459f02-ac51-4c09-b511-b8c9203fc429
status: test
description: Detects calls to "SyncInvoke" that is part of the "CL_Invocation.ps1" script to proxy execution using "System.Diagnostics.Process"
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Cl_invocation/
    - https://twitter.com/bohops/status/948061991012327424
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova
date: 2020-10-14
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1216
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        # Note: As this function is usually called from within powershell, classical process creation even would not catch it. This will only catch inline calls via "-Command" or "-ScriptBlock" flags for example.
        CommandLine|contains: 'SyncInvoke '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

• Unknown

Source references

• https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Cl_invocation/
• https://twitter.com/bohops/status/948061991012327424