1200KM / sigma-rule
Registry Modification Attempt Via VBScript — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 921aa10f-2e74-4cca-9498-98f9ca4d6fdf. Registry Modification Attempt Via VBScript — Sigma Rule. Detects attempts to modify the registry using VBScript's CreateObject("Wscript.shell") and RegWrite methods via common LOLBINs. It could be an attempt to modify the registry for persistence without using straightforward methods like regedit.exe, reg.exe, or PowerShell. Threat Actors may use this technique to evade detection by security solutions that monitor for direct registry modifications through traditional tools.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems). Source status: experimental; severity: medium. Source dates: 2025-08-13 / not supplied.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: e0f35b083a30da01dbd95c205f99092f90028a0da592c17cac33907678279b91
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Registry Modification Attempt Via VBScript
id: 921aa10f-2e74-4cca-9498-98f9ca4d6fdf
related:
- id: 2a0a169d-cc66-43ce-9ae2-6e678e54e46a
type: similar
- id: 7f4c43f9-b1a5-4c7d-b24a-b41bf3a3ebf2
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects attempts to modify the registry using VBScript's CreateObject("Wscript.shell") and RegWrite methods via common LOLBINs.
It could be an attempt to modify the registry for persistence without using straightforward methods like regedit.exe, reg.exe, or PowerShell.
Threat Actors may use this technique to evade detection by security solutions that monitor for direct registry modifications through traditional tools.
references:
- https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mauricefielenbach_livingofftheland-redteam-persistence-activity-7344801774182051843-TE00/
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/2025/07/29/detecting-the-most-popular-mitre-persistence-method-registry-run-keys-startup-folder/
date: 2025-08-13
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1112
- attack.t1059.005
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'CreateObject'
- 'Wscript.shell'
- '.RegWrite'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.