1200KM / sigma-rule
Tap Driver Installation — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 8e4cf0e5-aa5d-4dc3-beff-dc26917744a9. Tap Driver Installation — Sigma Rule. Well-known TAP software installation. Possible preparation for data exfiltration using tunnelling techniques
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Ian Davis, oscd.community. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2019-10-24 / 2022-12-25.
{
"product": "windows",
"service": "system"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: e34acdb5285cc7a47142e8f23f6c3c83bf34eed473f18247453b140427e632e1
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Tap Driver Installation
id: 8e4cf0e5-aa5d-4dc3-beff-dc26917744a9
status: test
description: Well-known TAP software installation. Possible preparation for data exfiltration using tunnelling techniques
references:
- https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/wiki/ManagingWindowsTAPDrivers
author: Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Ian Davis, oscd.community
date: 2019-10-24
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.t1048
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ImagePath|contains: 'tap0901'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate OpenVPN TAP installation
level: medium
False positives
- Legitimate OpenVPN TAP installation
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.