1200KM / sigma-rule
Process Creation Attempt via Wmic.EXE — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 526be59f-a573-4eea-b5f7-f0973207634d. Process Creation Attempt via Wmic.EXE — Sigma Rule. Detects the attempt to create a process via "wmic" with the "process call create" flag, which might indicate an attempt to execute a malicious process on the compromised host. Adversaries may use wmic to execute a process on the compromised host as part of their attack. This event is triggered on on attempt and process creation can be either successful or unsuccessful.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Michael Haag, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), juju4, oscd.community. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2019-01-16 / 2023-02-14.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 0f73159c2959355741f6170f489a4effc9a60579638c7e7d5e79bdaf124ae739
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Process Creation Attempt via Wmic.EXE
id: 526be59f-a573-4eea-b5f7-f0973207634d
related:
- id: 3c89a1e8-0fba-449e-8f1b-8409d6267ec8 # For suspicious process creation
type: derived
status: test
description: |
Detects the attempt to create a process via "wmic" with the "process call create" flag, which might
indicate an attempt to execute a malicious process on the compromised host. Adversaries may use
wmic to execute a process on the compromised host as part of their attack. This event is triggered on
on attempt and process creation can be either successful or unsuccessful.
references:
- https://www.sans.org/blog/wmic-for-incident-response/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/84215139ee5127f8e3a117e063b604812bd71928/atomics/T1047/T1047.md#atomic-test-5---wmi-execute-local-process
author: Michael Haag, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), juju4, oscd.community
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2023-02-14
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047
- car.2016-03-002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'process'
- 'call'
- 'create'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
simulation:
- type: atomic red team
name: WMI Execute Local Process
technique: T1047
atomic_guid: b3bdfc91-b33e-4c6d-a5c8-d64bee0276b3
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_process_creation/info.yml
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.