1200KM / sigma-rule
HackTool - CoercedPotato Named Pipe Creation — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 4d0083b3-580b-40da-9bba-626c19fe4033. HackTool - CoercedPotato Named Pipe Creation — Sigma Rule. Detects the pattern of a pipe name as used by the hack tool CoercedPotato
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2023-10-11 / not supplied.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "pipe_created",
"definition": "Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 388dcfdc6c6683eadee44feebb0a5e848620fa78cb64fd11e18c43a70c8be78e
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: HackTool - CoercedPotato Named Pipe Creation
id: 4d0083b3-580b-40da-9bba-626c19fe4033
status: test
description: Detects the pattern of a pipe name as used by the hack tool CoercedPotato
references:
- https://blog.hackvens.fr/articles/CoercedPotato.html
- https://github.com/hackvens/CoercedPotato
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-10-11
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1055
logsource:
product: windows
category: pipe_created
definition: 'Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575'
detection:
selection:
PipeName|contains: '\coerced\'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.