1200KM / sigma-rule
Registry Modification Attempt Via VBScript - PowerShell — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 2a0a169d-cc66-43ce-9ae2-6e678e54e46a. Registry Modification Attempt Via VBScript - PowerShell — Sigma Rule. Detects attempts to modify the registry using VBScript's CreateObject("Wscript.shell") and RegWrite methods embedded within PowerShell scripts or commands. Threat actors commonly embed VBScript code within PowerShell to perform registry modifications, attempting to evade detection that monitors for direct registry access through traditional tools. This technique can be used for persistence, defense evasion, and privilege escalation by modifying registry keys without using regedit.exe, reg.exe, or PowerShell's native registry cmdlets.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems). Source status: experimental; severity: medium. Source dates: 2025-08-13 / not supplied.
{
"category": "ps_script",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 03a27cb4427ec5fb1f9abbf24e776e4f31cc3e85909e17c9625525c3f7b6e187
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Registry Modification Attempt Via VBScript - PowerShell
id: 2a0a169d-cc66-43ce-9ae2-6e678e54e46a
related:
- id: 921aa10f-2e74-4cca-9498-98f9ca4d6fdf
type: similar
- id: 7f4c43f9-b1a5-4c7d-b24a-b41bf3a3ebf2
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects attempts to modify the registry using VBScript's CreateObject("Wscript.shell") and RegWrite methods embedded within PowerShell scripts or commands.
Threat actors commonly embed VBScript code within PowerShell to perform registry modifications, attempting to evade detection that monitors for direct registry access through traditional tools.
This technique can be used for persistence, defense evasion, and privilege escalation by modifying registry keys without using regedit.exe, reg.exe, or PowerShell's native registry cmdlets.
references:
- https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mauricefielenbach_livingofftheland-redteam-persistence-activity-7344801774182051843-TE00/
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/2025/07/29/detecting-the-most-popular-mitre-persistence-method-registry-run-keys-startup-folder/
- https://detect.fyi/hunting-fileless-malware-in-the-windows-registry-1339ccde00ad
date: 2025-08-13
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1112
- attack.t1059.005
logsource:
category: ps_script
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'CreateObject'
- 'Wscript.shell'
- '.RegWrite'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Some legitimate admin or install scripts may use these processes for registry modifications.
level: medium
False positives
- Some legitimate admin or install scripts may use these processes for registry modifications.
Source references
- https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mauricefielenbach_livingofftheland-redteam-persistence-activity-7344801774182051843-TE00/
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/2025/07/29/detecting-the-most-popular-mitre-persistence-method-registry-run-keys-startup-folder/
- https://detect.fyi/hunting-fileless-malware-in-the-windows-registry-1339ccde00ad
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.