1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential Process Reconnaissance via Wmic.EXE — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 221b251a-357a-49a9-920a-271802777cc0. Potential Process Reconnaissance via Wmic.EXE — Sigma Rule. Detects the execution of "wmic" with the "process" flag, which might indicate an attempt to perform reconnaissance on running processes. Adversaries may use wmic to query for running processes and their details as part of their reconnaissance efforts.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: frack113. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2022-01-01 / 2025-12-15.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: a2de36a81c89e9a4665ee479585bc049171d92dca392ef248f59bcea4937c238
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential Process Reconnaissance via Wmic.EXE
id: 221b251a-357a-49a9-920a-271802777cc0
status: test
description: |
Detects the execution of "wmic" with the "process" flag, which might indicate an attempt to perform reconnaissance on running processes.
Adversaries may use wmic to query for running processes and their details as part of their reconnaissance efforts.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1047/T1047.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wmic
author: frack113
date: 2022-01-01
modified: 2025-12-15
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047
- attack.discovery
- attack.t1057
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\WMIC.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains: 'process'
filter_main_creation:
CommandLine|contains|all:
# Rule id 526be59f-a573-4eea-b5f7-f0973207634d for `wmic process call create #{process_to_execute}`
- 'call'
- 'create'
filter_main_terminate:
CommandLine|contains|all:
# Rule id 49d9671b-0a0a-4c09-8280-d215bfd30662 for `wmic path win32_process where processid=#{processid_to_terminate} call terminate`
- 'call'
- 'terminate'
condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
simulation:
- type: atomic-red-team
name: WMI Reconnaissance Processes
technique: T1047
atomic_guid: 5750aa16-0e59-4410-8b9a-8a47ca2788e2
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_recon_process/info.yml
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.