1200KM / sigma-rule
Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service Initiated — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849. Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service Initiated — Sigma Rule. Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" tunneling domains. Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware. While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2022-11-03 / 2024-02-02.
{
"category": "network_connection",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 4ce74f56f189a9af924b1223f882f7835b2af2dcd9cb2ee768de263816a85887
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service Initiated
id: 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849
related:
- id: 18249279-932f-45e2-b37a-8925f2597670
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" tunneling domains.
Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware.
While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
references:
- https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1
- https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-11-03
modified: 2024-02-02
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1567
- attack.t1568.002
- attack.t1572
- attack.t1090
- attack.t1102
- attack.s0508
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
DestinationHostname|contains:
- 'tunnel.us.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.eu.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.ap.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.au.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.sa.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.jp.ngrok.com'
- 'tunnel.in.ngrok.com'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of the ngrok service.
level: high
False positives
- Legitimate use of the ngrok service.
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.