Audit Policy Tampering Via Auditpol — Sigma Rule

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2021-02-02 / 2023-02-22.

{
  "category": "process_creation",
  "product": "windows"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: 7f8cb4a8250f361f33bec9eb5d20e83d04de438338eca2d6dc611236ba6a4152

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: Audit Policy Tampering Via Auditpol
id: 0a13e132-651d-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
related:
    - id: c6c56ada-612b-42d1-9a29-adad3c5c2c1e # Old auditpol
      type: similar
status: test
description: |
  Threat actors can use auditpol binary to change audit policy configuration to impair detection capability.
  This can be carried out by selectively disabling/removing certain audit policies as well as restoring a custom policy owned by the threat actor.
references:
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/
author: Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps)
date: 2021-02-02
modified: 2023-02-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith: '\auditpol.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'AUDITPOL.EXE'
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'disable' # disables a specific audit policy
            - 'clear'   # delete or clears audit policy
            - 'remove'  # removes an audit policy
            - 'restore' # restores an audit policy
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Administrator or administrator scripts might leverage the flags mentioned in the detection section. Either way, it should always be monitored
level: high

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

• Administrator or administrator scripts might leverage the flags mentioned in the detection section. Either way, it should always be monitored

Source references

• https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/