1200KM / sigma-rule
XSL Script Execution Via WMIC.EXE — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule 05c36dd6-79d6-4a9a-97da-3db20298ab2d. XSL Script Execution Via WMIC.EXE — Sigma Rule. Detects the execution of WMIC with the "format" flag to potentially load local XSL files. Adversaries abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel. Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2019-10-21 / 2026-01-24.
{
"category": "process_creation",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: b2a6e7ab1403d49d78a67004b22ec7a4660e57943549ab9fdb54f37f43e2ea51
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: XSL Script Execution Via WMIC.EXE
id: 05c36dd6-79d6-4a9a-97da-3db20298ab2d
related:
- id: 06ce37c2-61ab-4f05-9ff5-b1a96d18ae32
type: similar
- id: 8d63dadf-b91b-4187-87b6-34a1114577ea
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects the execution of WMIC with the "format" flag to potentially load local XSL files.
Adversaries abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application whitelisting defenses.
Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1220/T1220.md
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel
date: 2019-10-21
modified: 2026-01-24
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1220
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.005
- attack.t1059.007
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'wmic.exe'
- Hashes|contains: # Sysmon field hashes contains all types
- 'IMPHASH=1B1A3F43BF37B5BFE60751F2EE2F326E'
- 'IMPHASH=37777A96245A3C74EB217308F3546F4C'
- 'IMPHASH=9D87C9D67CE724033C0B40CC4CA1B206'
- 'IMPHASH=B12619881D79C3ACADF45E752A58554A'
- 'IMPHASH=16A48C3CABF98A9DC1BF02C07FE1EA00'
selection_cmd:
CommandLine|contains|windash: '-format:' # wmic process list -FORMAT /? or wmic process list /FORMAT /?
filter_main_known_format:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'Format:List'
- 'Format:htable'
- 'Format:hform'
- 'Format:table'
- 'Format:mof'
- 'Format:value'
- 'Format:rawxml'
- 'Format:xml'
- 'Format:csv'
filter_main_remote_operation: # Covered by 8d63dadf-b91b-4187-87b6-34a1114577ea
CommandLine|contains:
- '://'
- '\\\\'
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- WMIC.exe FP depend on scripts and administrative methods used in the monitored environment.
- Static format arguments - https://petri.com/command-line-wmi-part-3
level: medium
False positives
- WMIC.exe FP depend on scripts and administrative methods used in the monitored environment.
- Static format arguments - https://petri.com/command-line-wmi-part-3
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.