1200KM / detection
T1137.002 Office Test — Detection Rules
Detection workspace for T1137.002 Office Test: 2 Sigma sources, 0 Atlas concepts and 0 anomaly models. No live detection validation.
Source-backed rule directory
- Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process - MacOS · test · high · {"product":"macos","category":"process_creation"}
- Office Application Startup - Office Test · test · medium · {"category":"registry_event","product":"windows"}
Atlas deterministic concepts
No exact concept selected.
Anomaly models
No exact Atlas model in this snapshot.
ATT&CK analytic guidance
DET0315 Detect Persistence via Office Test Registry DLL Injection
AN0880 Analytic 0880
Adversaries create the 'Office Test\Special\Perf' registry key and specify a malicious DLL path that is auto-loaded when an Office application starts. This DLL is injected into the Office process memory space and can provide persistent execution without requiring macro enablement.
AN0881 Analytic 0881
Office application auto-loads a non-standard DLL during startup triggered via Office Test Registry key, often without macro warning banners. DLL persistence mechanism circumvents traditional macro defenses.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Simulation, tools and telemetry
T1137.002 simulation workspace
- Command Execution · DC0064
- File Creation · DC0039
- Module Load · DC0016
- Process Creation · DC0032
- Windows Registry Key Modification · DC0063
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing anomaly research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.