Phishing
Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., Email Hiding Rules). Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools, or by including the intended target as a party to an existing email thread that includes malicious files or links (i.e., "thread hijacking"). Victims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware, or install adversary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (i.e., User Execution).
Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace
Detection logic
Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. Because most common third-party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once User Execution occurs.
Observed actors
Correlated CTI and IR reports
Check Point Research · direct source mappingMuddyWater G0069
MITRE ATT&CK · direct source mappingNew Tradecraft of Iranian Cyber Group Aria Sepehr Ayandehsazan aka Emennet Pasargad
FBI / US Treasury / Israel National Cyber Directorate · direct source mappingCTI Research: Handala Hack Group aka Handala Hack Team
Andrey Pautov · direct source mappingAPT39 (Chafer / Remix Kitten)
Israel Threat Actors CTI · explicit report mentionATT&CK as a Working Tool: Theory and Hands-On Practical Usage
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionCTI Research: Handala Hack Group (aka Handala Hack Team)
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionCTI Research: Handala Hack Group (aka Handala Hack Team)
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionCTI Research: Kubernetes & Cloud-Native Threat Landscape
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionCTI Research: LLM/AI/MCP Usage in the Cyber Kill Chain
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionCTI Research: LLM/AI/MCP Usage in the Cyber Kill Chain
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionDefensive CTI Research on Threats to Israeli Government and Public-Sector Environments
Israel Threat Actors CTI · explicit report mentionExecutive Summary
Israel Threat Actors CTI · explicit report mentionFrom Threat Intelligence to Detection: A Practitioner's Guide
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionIOC Tables — MuddyWater / Seedworm (Mango Sandstorm)
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mentionOilRig (APT34 / Helix Kitten / Earth Simnavaz etc)
Israel Threat Actors CTI · explicit report mentionWorked Cases
Israel Threat Actors CTI · explicit report mentionATT CK as a Working Tool Theory and Hands On Practical Usage
1200km Medium · authored report mentionCTI Analyst Field Manual Complete Reference
1200km Medium · authored report mentionCTI Led Defensive Strategy for a Cellular Provider Case Study
1200km Medium · authored report mentionCTI Research Handala Hack Group aka Handala Hack Team
1200km Medium · authored report mentionCTI Research Kubernetes Cloud Native Threat Landscape
1200km Medium · authored report mentionCorrelation Based Detection Rules in Cybersecurity From Atomic Events to Behavioral Insight
1200km Medium · authored report mentionFrom Threat Intelligence to Detection A Practitioner s Guide
1200km Medium · authored report mention