T1486 · impact · 12 actors · 16 correlated reports

Data Encrypted for Impact

Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted. In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted (and often renamed and/or tagged with specific file markers). Adversaries may need to first employ other behaviors, such as File and Directory Permissions Modification or System Shutdown/Reboot, in order to unlock and/or gain access to manipulate these files. In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR. To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares. Encryption malware may also leverage Internal Defacement, such as changing victim wallpapers, or otherwise intimidate victims by sending ransom notes or other messages to connected printers (known as "print bombing"). In cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.

Open detection, hunting, mitigation, and evidence workspace

Detection logic

Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories. In some cases, monitoring for unusual kernel driver installation activity can aid in detection. In cloud environments, monitor for events that indicate storage objects have been anomalously replaced by copies.

Observed actors

Correlated CTI and IR reports

Agrius G1030
MITRE ATT&CK · direct source mapping
Iranian Government-Sponsored Threat Actor MuddyWater
Israel National Cyber Directorate · direct source mapping
IRGC-Affiliated Actors Exploit Vulnerabilities for Data Extortion and Disk Encryption
CISA · curated primary-source mapping
APT41 Targeting Pharmaceutical Sector: Log4Shell to Domain Compromise
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mention
ATT&CK as a Working Tool: Theory and Hands-On Practical Usage
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mention
Attack Playbook — Operation DragonRx
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mention
CTI Research: Sandworm / APT44
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mention
CTI Research: Sandworm / APT44
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mention
Operation DragonRx — APT41 Full Attack Simulation
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mention
Operation DragonRx: Simulating an APT41 Attack End-to-End — From Log4Shell to DFIR and Malware Analysis
1200km CTI repository · explicit report mention
APT41 Targeting Pharmaceutical Sector Log4Shell to Domain Compromise
1200km Medium · authored report mention
ATT CK as a Working Tool Theory and Hands On Practical Usage
1200km Medium · authored report mention
Attack Playbook Operation DragonRx
1200km Medium · authored report mention
CTI Research Sandworm APT44
1200km Medium · authored report mention
Correlation Based Detection Rules in Cybersecurity From Atomic Events to Behavioral Insight
1200km Medium · authored report mention
Operation DragonRx Simulating an APT41 Attack End to End From Log4Shell to DFIR and Malware
1200km Medium · authored report mention

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