Zeek file analysis JSON
Zeek file analysis JSON. Zeek protocol analysis produces structured metadata from observed network traffic.
Source and collection
Corresponding Zeek log stream with JSON output enabled; default TSV is a different serialization.
Document sensor placement, packet loss, enabled analyzers and JSON logging configuration.
Native example and provenance
publisher documentation example. Published example; no independent capture provenance claimed.
Original publisher / pinned upstream fixture — preformatted example 7
One complete record selected; values unchanged.
Download the exact sample · Offline research kit
SHA-256: 2147c5e00848cf7c329729eec3462f0065fc40758f4bb3d52614a7c4ecdbe22a
{
"ts": 1596820191.969902,
"fuid": "FBbQxG1GXLXgmWhbk9",
"uid": "CzoFRWTQ6YIzfFXHk",
"id.orig_h": "192.168.4.37",
"id.orig_p": 58264,
"id.resp_h": "23.195.64.241",
"id.resp_p": 80,
"source": "HTTP",
"depth": 0,
"analyzers": [
"EXTRACT",
"PE"
],
"mime_type": "application/x-dosexec",
"duration": 0.015498876571655273,
"is_orig": false,
"seen_bytes": 179272,
"total_bytes": 179272,
"missing_bytes": 0,
"overflow_bytes": 0,
"timedout": false,
"extracted": "HTTP-FBbQxG1GXLXgmWhbk9.exe",
"extracted_cutoff": false
}
Structure and field interpretation
| Field/path | Serialized type |
|---|---|
ts | float |
fuid | str |
uid | str |
id.orig_h | str |
id.orig_p | int |
id.resp_h | str |
id.resp_p | int |
source | str |
depth | int |
analyzers | array |
analyzers[0] | str |
mime_type | str |
duration | float |
is_orig | bool |
seen_bytes | int |
total_bytes | int |
missing_bytes | int |
overflow_bytes | int |
timedout | bool |
extracted | str |
extracted_cutoff | bool |
- ts
- Epoch timestamp of the logged activity.
- uid
- Connection identifier, when present; retain sensor context.
- fuid
- File identifier, when present.
- id.orig_h / id.resp_h
- Originator and responder addresses, not necessarily client intent.
Investigation uses
- Join file IDs to protocol and connection evidence.
- Join uid across connection and protocol logs; use fuid for file references when present.
Validation boundaries
Encrypted payloads and sensor visibility limit what can be observed. Missing fields are not equivalent to a negative finding.
This sample passed byte-integrity and JSON/XML parsing checks, including the catalogue’s specified event discriminators. This is not a complete vendor-schema validation or a tested detection.
For a simulation, first parse this fixture offline, then create a separately labelled synthetic variant and test it against the intended collector in an isolated lab. Never replay public example identities or destinations into production.
Related sources
Ecosystem connections
- Telemetry Library — ATT&CK data components
- Detection Rules — candidate detection content
- Threat hunting — from intelligence to validated defense
- Practical security learning paths
- AdversaryGraph — evidence-led investigation
References
Sample provenance is linked above. Field availability and product behavior must be checked against the deployed version.