Sysmon 7 — Image loaded
Sysmon 7 — Image loaded. Sysmon records image loaded through its Windows Operational channel.
Source and collection
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational; native XML export, not an EVTX binary file.
Install Sysmon and review the installed schema and filtering configuration. Use sysmon64 -s to inspect supported fields; preserve the deployed configuration version.
Native example and provenance
upstream test fixture. Published example; no independent capture provenance claimed.
Original publisher / pinned upstream fixture — events[195].event.original
Decoded event.original string; retained the complete Event XML element, excluding any appended rendered message; native XML values unchanged.
Pinned source commit: 9ae756f00f82786ac3496ce99c2dd288c5a5c031
Download the exact sample · Offline research kit
SHA-256: ea1a0e8a82ed6547451257a82dae7b4955fc6de36ea929da24d445230ade06e7
<Event xmlns='http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event'><System><Provider Name='Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon' Guid='{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}'/><EventID>7</EventID><Version>3</Version><Level>4</Level><Task>7</Task><Opcode>0</Opcode><Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords><TimeCreated SystemTime='2020-10-28T02:39:26.388325200Z'/><EventRecordID>10685</EventRecordID><Correlation/><Execution ProcessID='1676' ThreadID='4796'/><Channel>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</Channel><Computer>vagrant</Computer><Security UserID='S-1-5-18'/></System><EventData><Data Name='RuleName'>-</Data><Data Name='UtcTime'>2020-10-28 02:39:26.374</Data><Data Name='ProcessGuid'>{9f32b55f-d9de-5f98-f006-000000000600}</Data><Data Name='ProcessId'>5184</Data><Data Name='Image'>C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe</Data><Data Name='ImageLoaded'>C:\Windows\System32\IDStore.dll</Data><Data Name='FileVersion'>10.0.17763.1 (WinBuild.160101.0800)</Data><Data Name='Description'>Identity Store</Data><Data Name='Product'>Microsoft« Windows« Operating System</Data><Data Name='Company'>Microsoft Corporation</Data><Data Name='OriginalFileName'>IdStore.dll</Data><Data Name='Hashes'>SHA1=9955A1C071C44A7CEECC0D928A9CFB7F64CC3F93,MD5=C7C45610F644906E6F7D664EF2E45B08,SHA256=4808F1101F4E42387D8DDB7A355668BAE3BF6F781C42D3BCD82E23446B1DEB3E,IMPHASH=194F3797B52231028C718B6D776C6853</Data><Data Name='Signed'>true</Data><Data Name='Signature'>Microsoft Windows</Data><Data Name='SignatureStatus'>Valid</Data></EventData></Event>
Structure and field interpretation
| Field/path | Serialized type |
|---|---|
Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon | XML text |
EventID | XML text |
Version | XML text |
Level | XML text |
Task | XML text |
Opcode | XML text |
Keywords | XML text |
TimeCreated | XML text |
EventRecordID | XML text |
Correlation | XML text |
Execution | XML text |
Channel | XML text |
Computer | XML text |
Security | XML text |
RuleName | XML text |
UtcTime | XML text |
ProcessGuid | XML text |
ProcessId | XML text |
Image | XML text |
ImageLoaded | XML text |
FileVersion | XML text |
Description | XML text |
Product | XML text |
Company | XML text |
OriginalFileName | XML text |
Hashes | XML text |
Signed | XML text |
Signature | XML text |
SignatureStatus | XML text |
- EventID
- 7 in Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon.
- UtcTime
- Producer-supplied event time.
- ProcessGuid
- Process correlation identifier where present; case-sensitive field names vary by event.
- Relevant fields
- Image, ImageLoaded, Signed, SignatureStatus
Investigation uses
- Investigate unusual DLL paths and signature context.
- Correlate ProcessGuid across Sysmon events; keep the host identity and time interval with every join.
Validation boundaries
Image-load logging must be enabled; signature information can arrive asynchronously and is not a trust verdict.
This sample passed byte-integrity and JSON/XML parsing checks, including the catalogue’s specified event discriminators. This is not a complete vendor-schema validation or a tested detection.
For a simulation, first parse this fixture offline, then create a separately labelled synthetic variant and test it against the intended collector in an isolated lab. Never replay public example identities or destinations into production.
Related sources
Ecosystem connections
- Telemetry Library — ATT&CK data components
- Detection Rules — candidate detection content
- Threat hunting — from intelligence to validated defense
- Practical security learning paths
- AdversaryGraph — evidence-led investigation
References
Sample provenance is linked above. Field availability and product behavior must be checked against the deployed version.