Suspicious and Malicious Activity by MITRE ATT&CK
This catalog describes observable suspicious and malicious activity aligned to the current MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics and techniques. Each activity links directly to the vendor-neutral log sources that can report it.
ATT&CK techniques describe how adversaries achieve an objective. A single activity can map to multiple techniques, and a single technique can produce several observable activities. The listed log sources indicate potential observability, not guaranteed detection. Collection, audit policy, retention, and field availability still determine whether the activity is visible.
Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance activity occurs before initial access and is often observable only at public-facing systems or through external monitoring.
| Suspicious or malicious activity | ATT&CK | Log sources that can report it |
|---|---|---|
| Repeated probing of public services, ports, and protocols | T1595 Active Scanning | Network Firewall Logs, Network Flow Logs, Network Intrusion Detection Logs, Web Application Firewall Logs |
| Enumeration of public web paths, APIs, parameters, and files | T1595.003 Wordlist Scanning | Web Server Access Logs, Web Application Firewall Logs, API Gateway Logs |
| DNS enumeration and attempted zone transfer | T1590 Gather Victim Network Information | Authoritative DNS Logs, Network Intrusion Detection Logs |
| Scraping public applications, repositories, or exposed documents | T1593 Search Open Websites/Domains | Web Server Access Logs, API Gateway Logs, Source-Code Management Audit Logs |
| Discovery of newly exposed public assets and services | T1595 Active Scanning | Attack-Surface Management Logs, Network Firewall Logs |
Resource Development
Most resource-development activity occurs outside the target environment. It becomes observable when adversary-controlled infrastructure or capabilities interact with monitored systems.
| Suspicious or malicious activity | ATT&CK | Log sources that can report it |
|---|---|---|
| Lookalike domain, certificate, or external infrastructure begins interacting with the environment | T1583 Acquire Infrastructure | DNS Resolver Logs, TLS and Certificate Metadata Logs, Threat-Intelligence Platform Logs |
| Staged malicious files or tools are delivered from external hosting | T1608 Stage Capabilities | Proxy and Secure Web Gateway Logs, Email Gateway Logs, Content Inspection and Malware Scanning Logs |
| Compromised accounts or infrastructure are used to distribute content | T1584 Compromise Infrastructure | Identity Provider Sign-In Logs, Email Gateway Logs, Web Server Access Logs |
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
| Suspicious or malicious activity | ATT&CK | Log sources that can report it |
|---|---|---|
| Process or account invokes an elevation-control mechanism | T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Process Execution Logs, Linux Authentication Logs, Windows Security Event Logs |
| Exploit causes a process to gain elevated privileges | T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Endpoint Detection and Response Telemetry, System-Call Telemetry, Memory-Protection and Exploit-Mitigation Logs |
| Permissions, roles, or group memberships grant new administrative access | T1098 Account Manipulation | Directory-Service Audit Logs, Identity Provider Audit Logs, Cloud Identity and Access Management Logs |
| Access token, process token, or security context is manipulated | T1134 Access Token Manipulation | Windows Security Event Logs, Process Execution Logs, Endpoint Detection and Response Telemetry |
| Privileged container or workload is created | T1610 Deploy Container | Orchestrator Audit Logs, Container Runtime Security Logs, Container Runtime Logs |
Defense Evasion (TA0005) — Evasion Behaviors
Defense Evasion (TA0005) — Defense Impairment Behaviors
Credential Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
Command and Control
Exfiltration
Impact
Observability Notes
- A linked source can report an activity only when the relevant audit or collection capability is enabled.
- Several sources are often required to establish actor, action, target, timing, and outcome.
- Some ATT&CK activities occur outside defender-controlled infrastructure and may have no direct internal log source.
- Aggregation platforms such as EDR, NDR, SIEM, XDR, and UEBA derive activity from underlying sources and should not replace source-level collection.
- ATT&CK mappings should be validated against the exact technique and platform before being used in production detection content.