1200KM / telemetry
Operational document access audit — Detection Telemetry
Access to operational documentation through a repository or document service.
Collection and providers
Enable document-read/download audit on the lab repository; retain document ID, identity and result without storing document bodies.
- Application audit logs: First-party service events and request/result fields; schema is application-specific.
- OpenTelemetry-compatible log pipelines: Transport and normalization of emitted records; do not create missing audit instrumentation.
Configuration
- Enable the application audit category or instrument the owned lab application at the authorization/action boundary.
- Define a schema with timestamp, service, actor, object, action, result and correlation ID. Export structured records through an authenticated collector.
- Redact secrets and personal content, separate audit from debug logs, set retention and verify delivery during rotation/restart.
Synthetic event example
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "proposed-operational-document-access-audit",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"document_id": "lab-procedure-1",
"actor": "lab-reader",
"action": "download",
"result": "success"
}
}Visibility and validation
Debug output is not necessarily a durable audit trail. Application developers must emit the relevant event; installing a log pipeline does not make an absent event exist.
- Record the lab scope, collector version, effective configuration and expected source fields before testing.
- Use an approved benign action or read-only snapshot appropriate to this type. For destructive, privileged or physical effects, use a reviewed fixture or existing authorized evidence instead of causing the effect.
- Verify the native source record locally and at the collector; compare timestamps, identity, object, action/result and the type-specific fields listed below. Save a redacted real capture separately from the synthetic example.
- Check a normal baseline and collector-loss case. Fixture parsing proves parser behavior only; it does not prove sensor coverage or malicious-behavior detection.
Primary sources
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Related simulations and detection workspaces
Each workspace retains its own logsource and platform requirements. A technique-level association is not a per-rule sensor mapping.
Attack tools through shared TTPs
These are two-hop navigation links through explicitly associated techniques, not independent tool-to-sensor assertions.
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Native security log sources
Security log-source library groups concrete producers and formats separately from ATT&CK data components. Samples carry provenance and version limits; associations do not prove collection coverage.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.