1200KM / telemetry
Response Content — Detection Telemetry
Content returned by a queried service, such as an HTTP response body or banner.
Collection and providers
Capture responses only from authorized lab services or approved datasets; retain request context, response hash and a sanitized bounded excerpt.
- Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
- Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
Configuration
- Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
- Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
- Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.
Synthetic event example
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0104",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"service": "https://lab.example.test/health",
"response_excerpt": "LAB_OK",
"content_type": "text/plain",
"body_truncated": false
}
}Visibility and validation
Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.
- Record the lab scope, collector version, effective configuration and expected source fields before testing.
- Use an approved benign action or read-only snapshot appropriate to this type. For destructive, privileged or physical effects, use a reviewed fixture or existing authorized evidence instead of causing the effect.
- Verify the native source record locally and at the collector; compare timestamps, identity, object, action/result and the type-specific fields listed below. Save a redacted real capture separately from the synthetic example.
- Check a normal baseline and collector-loss case. Fixture parsing proves parser behavior only; it does not prove sensor coverage or malicious-behavior detection.
Primary sources
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Related simulations and detection workspaces
Each workspace retains its own logsource and platform requirements. A technique-level association is not a per-rule sensor mapping.
- T1583 · Acquire Infrastructure · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1583.003 · Virtual Private Server · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1583.004 · Server · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1583.006 · Web Services · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1583.007 · Serverless · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1583.008 · Malvertising · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1584 · Compromise Infrastructure · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1584.003 · Virtual Private Server · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1584.004 · Server · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1584.006 · Web Services · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1584.007 · Serverless · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1584.008 · Network Devices · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1587 · Develop Capabilities · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1587.003 · Digital Certificates · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1588 · Obtain Capabilities · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1588.004 · Digital Certificates · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1592 · Gather Victim Host Information · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1592.001 · Hardware · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1592.002 · Software · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1592.004 · Client Configurations · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1608 · Stage Capabilities · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1608.001 · Upload Malware · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1608.002 · Upload Tool · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1608.003 · Install Digital Certificate · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1608.004 · Drive-by Target · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1608.005 · Link Target · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1608.006 · SEO Poisoning · Detection rules & anomalies
- T1665 · Hide Infrastructure · Detection rules & anomalies
Attack tools through shared TTPs
These are two-hop navigation links through explicitly associated techniques, not independent tool-to-sensor assertions.
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Native security log sources
Security log-source library groups concrete producers and formats separately from ATT&CK data components. Samples carry provenance and version limits; associations do not prove collection coverage.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.