1200kmSECURITY RESEARCH
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1200KM / telemetry

Snapshot Deletion — Detection Telemetry

Deletion of a resource snapshot or recovery-point artifact.

Collection and providers

Collect snapshot-delete control-plane events; join the immutable snapshot ID and completion state with backup inventory.

  • AWS CloudTrail: Management-plane API activity; supported resource/data events require separate selectors.
  • Azure Monitor Activity Log: Azure resource control-plane operations; resource data-plane logs are separate.
  • Google Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity and other categories; configure Data Access where required.

Configuration

  • In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.
  • Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.
  • Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies.

Synthetic event example

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0049",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "snapshot_id": "snap-lab-1",
    "action": "delete",
    "actor": "lab-admin",
    "result": "requested"
  }
}

Visibility and validation

AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.

  • Record the lab scope, collector version, effective configuration and expected source fields before testing.
  • Use an approved benign action or read-only snapshot appropriate to this type. For destructive, privileged or physical effects, use a reviewed fixture or existing authorized evidence instead of causing the effect.
  • Verify the native source record locally and at the collector; compare timestamps, identity, object, action/result and the type-specific fields listed below. Save a redacted real capture separately from the synthetic example.
  • Check a normal baseline and collector-loss case. Fixture parsing proves parser behavior only; it does not prove sensor coverage or malicious-behavior detection.

Primary sources

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Each workspace retains its own logsource and platform requirements. A technique-level association is not a per-rule sensor mapping.

Attack tools through shared TTPs

These are two-hop navigation links through explicitly associated techniques, not independent tool-to-sensor assertions.

No reviewed association in this snapshot.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.