1200KM / telemetry
Windows Registry Key Deletion — Detection Telemetry
Deletion of a Windows registry key or value.
Collection and providers
Collect RegistryEvent (12), distinguishing DeleteKey/DeleteValue from create operations. Event 13 is value-set activity, not deletion.
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
Configuration
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- Keep this Windows-specific source separate from other operating systems; there is no direct cross-platform event-ID equivalence.
Synthetic event example
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0045",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"registry_path": "HKCU\\Software\\Lab\\Demo",
"event_type": "DeleteKey",
"process_id": 4200
}
}Visibility and validation
Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
- Record the lab scope, collector version, effective configuration and expected source fields before testing.
- Use an approved benign action or read-only snapshot appropriate to this type. For destructive, privileged or physical effects, use a reviewed fixture or existing authorized evidence instead of causing the effect.
- Verify the native source record locally and at the collector; compare timestamps, identity, object, action/result and the type-specific fields listed below. Save a redacted real capture separately from the synthetic example.
- Check a normal baseline and collector-loss case. Fixture parsing proves parser behavior only; it does not prove sensor coverage or malicious-behavior detection.
Primary sources
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Related simulations and detection workspaces
Each workspace retains its own logsource and platform requirements. A technique-level association is not a per-rule sensor mapping.
Attack tools through shared TTPs
These are two-hop navigation links through explicitly associated techniques, not independent tool-to-sensor assertions.
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.