1200KM / telemetry
Pod Creation — Detection Telemetry
A request to create a Kubernetes Pod and its recorded API outcome.
Collection and providers
Include create on pods in the audit policy; retain namespace, requesting user and response code, and join runtime evidence for actual startup.
- Kubernetes API audit: Who requested a resource action and how the API server handled it.
- Managed Kubernetes audit exports: Provider-managed equivalent when control-plane flags are not customer-configurable.
Configuration
- Configure a lab audit policy and log/webhook backend, or the managed service audit export. Start with Metadata for the required verbs/resources and namespace.
- Add narrowly scoped Request or RequestResponse only when bodies are required; secrets and tokens can leak into audit data.
- Keep auditID, stage, user, verb, objectRef, sourceIPs and responseStatus. Correlate API requests with scheduler, kubelet or runtime state before asserting execution.
apiVersion: audit.k8s.io/v1
kind: Policy
rules:
- level: Metadata
namespaces: ["lab"]
verbs: ["create"]
resources:
- group: ""
resources: ["pods"]
- level: NoneThis intentionally narrow teaching policy is not a production audit baseline. A self-managed API server also needs an audit policy file and log/webhook backend; managed services expose provider-specific controls. Do not replace an existing broader policy with this example.
Synthetic event example
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0019",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"verb": "create",
"resource": "pods",
"namespace": "lab",
"name": "demo-pod",
"response_code": 201
}
}Visibility and validation
An API create request does not prove a container ran. Audit stage and response code matter. Pod logs and API audit logs serve different purposes.
- Record the lab scope, collector version, effective configuration and expected source fields before testing.
- Use an approved benign action or read-only snapshot appropriate to this type. For destructive, privileged or physical effects, use a reviewed fixture or existing authorized evidence instead of causing the effect.
- Verify the native source record locally and at the collector; compare timestamps, identity, object, action/result and the type-specific fields listed below. Save a redacted real capture separately from the synthetic example.
- Check a normal baseline and collector-loss case. Fixture parsing proves parser behavior only; it does not prove sensor coverage or malicious-behavior detection.
Primary sources
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Related simulations and detection workspaces
Each workspace retains its own logsource and platform requirements. A technique-level association is not a per-rule sensor mapping.
Attack tools through shared TTPs
These are two-hop navigation links through explicitly associated techniques, not independent tool-to-sensor assertions.
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Native security log sources
Security log-source library groups concrete producers and formats separately from ATT&CK data components. Samples carry provenance and version limits; associations do not prove collection coverage.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.