1200kmSECURITY RESEARCH
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1200KM / telemetry

Malware Content — Detection Telemetry

The bytes or extracted content of a malware sample used in analysis, rather than only its filename or verdict.

Collection and providers

Use an isolated sample repository and authorized analysis tooling; preserve hashes, extraction method and custody. Do not execute samples to populate this page.

  • YARA: Static rule matches and matched strings on authorized files; not proof of execution or attribution.
  • Authorized sample repositories / STIX analysis reports: Sample identity, provenance and analysis observations; access and retention are separately controlled.

Configuration

  • Work offline with an authorized sample or benign fixture; record its SHA-256, origin and custody before analysis.
  • For static matching, pin reviewed YARA rules/tool version and capture match IDs and offsets where needed. Treat untrusted rules and samples as untrusted input.
  • Store sanitized findings separately from restricted sample bytes. Label static observations, verdicts and any independently obtained dynamic results distinctly.

Synthetic event example

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0011",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "sample_sha256": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
    "artifact_kind": "extracted_string",
    "content": "BENIGN LAB MARKER",
    "offset": 4096
  }
}

Visibility and validation

A rule match is not a confirmed infection. Metadata is not payload content, and static analysis does not prove a behavior occurred on a victim. No samples are executed by this module.

  • Record the lab scope, collector version, effective configuration and expected source fields before testing.
  • Use an approved benign action or read-only snapshot appropriate to this type. For destructive, privileged or physical effects, use a reviewed fixture or existing authorized evidence instead of causing the effect.
  • Verify the native source record locally and at the collector; compare timestamps, identity, object, action/result and the type-specific fields listed below. Save a redacted real capture separately from the synthetic example.
  • Check a normal baseline and collector-loss case. Fixture parsing proves parser behavior only; it does not prove sensor coverage or malicious-behavior detection.

Primary sources

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Each workspace retains its own logsource and platform requirements. A technique-level association is not a per-rule sensor mapping.

Attack tools through shared TTPs

These are two-hop navigation links through explicitly associated techniques, not independent tool-to-sensor assertions.

No reviewed association in this snapshot.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.