1200kmSECURITY RESEARCH
Loading interactive filters…

1200KM / telemetry

Malware Content — Detection Telemetry

The bytes or extracted content of a malware sample used in analysis, rather than only its filename or verdict.

Collection and providers

Use an isolated sample repository and authorized analysis tooling; preserve hashes, extraction method and custody. Do not execute samples to populate this page.

  • YARA: Static rule matches and matched strings on authorized files; not proof of execution or attribution.
  • Authorized sample repositories / STIX analysis reports: Sample identity, provenance and analysis observations; access and retention are separately controlled.

Configuration

  • Work offline with an authorized sample or benign fixture; record its SHA-256, origin and custody before analysis.
  • For static matching, pin reviewed YARA rules/tool version and capture match IDs and offsets where needed. Treat untrusted rules and samples as untrusted input.
  • Store sanitized findings separately from restricted sample bytes. Label static observations, verdicts and any independently obtained dynamic results distinctly.

Synthetic event example

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

Synthetic normalized event
{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0011",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "sample_sha256": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
    "artifact_kind": "extracted_string",
    "content": "BENIGN LAB MARKER",
    "offset": 4096
  }
}

Visibility and validation

A rule match is not a confirmed infection. Metadata is not payload content, and static analysis does not prove a behavior occurred on a victim. No samples are executed by this module.

  • Record the lab scope, collector version, effective configuration and expected source fields before testing.
  • Use an approved benign action or read-only snapshot appropriate to this type. For destructive, privileged or physical effects, use a reviewed fixture or existing authorized evidence instead of causing the effect.
  • Verify the native source record locally and at the collector; compare timestamps, identity, object, action/result and the type-specific fields listed below. Save a redacted real capture separately from the synthetic example.
  • Check a normal baseline and collector-loss case. Fixture parsing proves parser behavior only; it does not prove sensor coverage or malicious-behavior detection.

Primary sources

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Each workspace retains its own logsource and platform requirements. A technique-level association is not a per-rule sensor mapping.

Attack tools through shared TTPs

These are two-hop navigation links through explicitly associated techniques, not independent tool-to-sensor assertions.

No reviewed association in this snapshot.

Native security log sources

Security log-source library groups concrete producers and formats separately from ATT&CK data components. Samples carry provenance and version limits; associations do not prove collection coverage.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.