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T1578.001 Create Snapshot — Attack Simulation

An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in Revert Cloud Instance where an adversary may revert to…

Complete technique description

An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in Revert Cloud Instance where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.

An adversary may Create Cloud Instance, mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.[Mandiant M-Trends 2020]

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Parent and sub-techniques

Related pages are navigation context. Their tools, rules and lab results are not automatically inherited.

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

Snapshot Creation · source-mapped

DC0057 collection page — Collect snapshot-create APIs and subsequent state; link snapshot to source volume/instance and requesting principal.

Providers and collection configuration

  • In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.
  • Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.
  • Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies.

Required normalized fields: snapshot_id, source_volume, action, state.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0057",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "snapshot_id": "snap-lab-1",
    "source_volume": "vol-lab-1",
    "action": "create",
    "state": "pending"
  }
}

Visibility limits: AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.

Snapshot Metadata · source-mapped

DC0062 collection page — Collect authorized describe/list metadata with observation time and resource IDs; preserve original provider fields.

Providers and collection configuration

  • In the isolated account/project/subscription, route administrative audit logs to a protected destination with retention and access controls.
  • Select the relevant service, regions and read/write operations. Confirm whether the API below is a management or data event in the provider documentation.
  • Preserve actor/session, resource, request ID, service, operation, region and error details. Check delivery latency and avoid logging credentials or sensitive request bodies.

Required normalized fields: snapshot_id, owner, source_volume, state.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0062",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "snapshot_id": "snap-lab-1",
    "owner": "lab-account",
    "source_volume": "vol-lab-1",
    "state": "completed"
  }
}

Visibility limits: AWS, Azure and Google expose different APIs and event schemas. An accepted API request does not prove the final resource state; join asynchronous outcomes and inventory.

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

DET0423 Detection Strategy for Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Snapshot

MITRE detection strategy

AN1187 Analytic 1187

Detection focuses on correlating snapshot creation events with subsequent instance creation and mounting activities. From a defender perspective, suspicious sequences include snapshot creation by unexpected or newly created IAM users, snapshots created from sensitive volumes without preceding change-control activity, or snapshots immediately followed by mounting to unauthorized instances. Cross-referencing with user behavior, IP geolocation, and automation context helps distinguish benign backup operations from adversary-driven snapshot exploitation.

Platforms: IaaS.

Source rule directory and observation requirements

No exact-tagged Sigma source rule was imported. This does not establish that the technique is undetectable; the MITRE guidance and collection requirements remain relevant.

Before treating a rule as coverage

  1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
  2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
  3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
  4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1578.001 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

  • Cloud control plane: Per account, role, region and API: rare actions, new role-resource relationships, enumeration bursts and configuration changes. Separate deployment automation and organization-level administrative activity.
  1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
  2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
  3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
  4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

Software observed in source procedures

These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.

1 source-documented software associations
  • S1091 Pacu — tool.

    Pacu can create snapshots of EBS volumes and RDS instances.[GitHub Pacu]

    Exact relationship: relationship--eba5e32f-2817-4833-8d65-3ccb2d9d367c

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: 3 compatible documented candidates. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.

Azure - Create Snapshot from Managed Disk

Creates a snapshot of a managed disk in Azure using the Azure CLI.
Simulates adversary snapshotting behavior for persistence or data duplication.

Pinned Atomic procedure · 89e69b4b-3458-4ec6-b819-b3008debc1bc · iaas:azure · sh.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • azure_resource_group: The Azure resource group where the disk is located. (type string; source default myResourceGroup)
  • azure_disk_name: The Azure disk name. (type string; source default myDiskName)
  • azure_snapshot_name: The Azure snapshot name. (type string; source default mySnapshotName)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

3 prerequisite definitions:

  • Azure CLI must be installed.
  • Azure CLI must be authenticated.
  • Azure disk must exist.
AWS - Create Snapshot from EBS Volume

Creates an EBS snapshot in AWS using the AWS CLI.
This simulates an adversary duplicating volume data via snapshots for persistence or exfiltration.

Pinned Atomic procedure · a3c09662-85bb-4ea8-b15b-6dc8a844e236 · iaas:aws · sh.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • aws_region: AWS region where the volume is located. (type string; source default us-east-1)
  • aws_volume_id: The AWS EBS Volume ID to create a snapshot from. (type string; source default vol-0123456789abcdef0)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

3 prerequisite definitions:

  • AWS CLI must be installed.
  • AWS CLI must be authenticated.
  • EBS volume must exist.
GCP - Create Snapshot from Persistent Disk

Creates a snapshot of a persistent disk in GCP using the gcloud CLI.
Emulates adversary behavior to gain access to volume data or replicate environment state.

Pinned Atomic procedure · e6fbc036-91e7-4ad3-b9cb-f7210f40dd5d · iaas:gcp · sh.

Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.

Source-defined inputs

  • gcp_disk_name: The Google Cloud disk name. (type string; source default myDiskName)
  • gcp_zone: The Google Cloud zone where the disk is located. (type string; source default us-central1-a)
  • gcp_snapshot_name: The Google Cloud snapshot name. (type string; source default mySnapshotName)

Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.

3 prerequisite definitions:

  • gcloud CLI must be installed.
  • gcloud CLI must be authenticated.
  • GCP disk must exist.

Technique-specific experiment contract

  1. Choose one procedure implementing T1578.001 Create Snapshot; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
  2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
  3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
  4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
  5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Create Snapshot, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

Source-linked mitigations
  • M1018 User Account Management

    Limit permissions for creating snapshots or backups in accordance with least privilege. Organizations should limit the number of users within the organization with an IAM role that has administrative privileges, strive to reduce all permanent privileged role assignments, and conduct periodic entitlement reviews on IAM users, roles and policies.[Mandiant M-Trends 2020]

  • M1047 Audit

    Routinely check user permissions to ensure only the expected users have the capability to create snapshots and backups.

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Source procedure platform / method / executor tags:

Detection and collection

T1578.001 detection workspace

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.