Adversaries may reveal credentials of accounts that have disabled Kerberos preauthentication by Password Cracking Kerberos messages. Preauthentication offers protection against offline Password Cracking. When enabled, a user requesting access to a resource initiates communication with the Domain Controller (DC) by sending an Authentication Server Request (AS-REQ) message with a timestamp that is encrypted with the hash of their password. If and…
Preauthentication offers protection against offline Password Cracking. When enabled, a user requesting access to a resource initiates communication with the Domain Controller (DC) by sending an Authentication Server Request (AS-REQ) message with a timestamp that is encrypted with the hash of their password. If and only if the DC is able to successfully decrypt the timestamp with the hash of the user’s password, it will then send an Authentication Server Response (AS-REP) message that contains the Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) to the user. Part of the AS-REP message is signed with the user’s password.[Microsoft Kerberos Preauth 2014]
For each account found without preauthentication, an adversary may send an AS-REQ message without the encrypted timestamp and receive an AS-REP message with TGT data which may be encrypted with an insecure algorithm such as RC4. The recovered encrypted data may be vulnerable to offline Password Cracking attacks similarly to Kerberoasting and expose plaintext credentials. [Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017][Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019]
An account registered to a domain, with or without special privileges, can be abused to list all domain accounts that have preauthentication disabled by utilizing Windows tools like PowerShell with an LDAP filter. Alternatively, the adversary may send an AS-REQ message for each user. If the DC responds without errors, the account does not require preauthentication and the AS-REP message will already contain the encrypted data. [Harmj0y Roasting AS-REPs Jan 2017][Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019]
Related pages are navigation context. Their tools, rules and lab results are not automatically inherited.
Detection telemetry and configuration
These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.
Active Directory Credential Request · source-mapped
DC0084 collection page — Enable the relevant Account Logon subcategories on DCs, including Kerberos Authentication Service and Service Ticket Operations; preserve service/account, encryption and result.
Providers and collection configuration
Windows Security auditing: Policy-dependent account, object, task and logon records on the host that performs the operation.
Active Directory domain controllers: Directory changes and authentication records; collect from the relevant controllers, not only endpoints.
Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.
Process Creation · source-mapped
DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.
Providers and collection configuration
Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
Detects AS-REP roasting attempts by monitoring for Kerberos AS-REQ/AS-REP authentication patterns where preauthentication is disabled (Event ID 4768 with Pre-Auth Type 0). Correlates these requests with subsequent service ticket activity (Event ID 4769) and anomalies such as requests using weak RC4 encryption (etype 0x17). Excessive enumeration of accounts with 'Do not require Kerberos preauthentication' set in Active Directory is another key detection point.
Source rule directory and observation requirements
No exact-tagged Sigma source rule was imported. This does not establish that the technique is undetectable; the MITRE guidance and collection requirements remain relevant.
Before treating a rule as coverage
Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.
Anomaly-based detection
No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1558.004 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.
Anomaly engineering worksheet
Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.
Windows and directory audit: Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance.
Endpoint activity: Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity.
Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.
These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.
Atomic evidence: 3 compatible documented candidates. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.
Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.
Rubeus asreproast
Information on the Rubeus tool and it's creators found here: https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus#asreproast This build targets .NET 4.5. If targeting a different version you will need to compile Rubeus
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
Source-defined inputs
local_folder: Local path of Rubeus executable (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\..\ExternalPayloads)
local_executable: name of the rubeus executable (type string; source default rubeus.exe)
out_file: file where command results are stored (type string; source default rubeus_output.txt)
rubeus_url: URL of Rubeus executable (type url; source default https://github.com/morgansec/Rubeus/raw/de21c6607e9a07182a2d2eea20bb67a22d3fbf95/Rubeus/bin/Debug/Rubeus45.exe)
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
2 prerequisite definitions:
Computer must be domain joined
Rubeus must exist
WinPwn - PowerSharpPack - Kerberoasting Using Rubeus
PowerSharpPack - Kerberoasting Using Rubeus technique via function of WinPwn
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
No input arguments declared.
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
Get-DomainUser with PowerView
Utilizing PowerView, run Get-DomainUser to identify domain users. Upon execution, progress and info about users within the domain being scanned will be displayed.
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: not declared. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
No input arguments declared.
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
Technique-specific experiment contract
Choose one procedure implementing T1558.004 AS-REP Roasting; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.
This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce AS-REP Roasting, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.
Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.
Validation status and remaining work
Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.
Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.
Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire. Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting. [AdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015]
Kerberos preauthentication is enabled by default. Older protocols might not support preauthentication therefore it is possible to have this setting disabled. Make sure that all accounts have preauthentication whenever possible and audit changes to setting. Windows tools such as PowerShell may be used to easily find which accounts have preauthentication disabled. [Microsoft Preauthentication Jul 2012][Stealthbits Cracking AS-REP Roasting Jun 2019]
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.