1200KM / simulation
T1555.006 Cloud Secrets Management Stores — Attack Simulation
Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Terraform Vault. Secrets managers support the secure centralized management of passwords, API keys, and other credential material. Where secrets managers are in use, cloud services can dynamically acquire credentials via API requests rather than accessing secrets insecurely stored in plain text…
Technique description
Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Terraform Vault. Secrets managers support the secure centralized management of passwords, API keys, and other credential material. Where secrets managers are in use, cloud services can dynamically acquire credentials via API requests rather than accessing secrets insecurely stored in plain text…
At least one platform-compatible Atomic procedure is documented. Individual review, lab prerequisites, and validation remain required.
Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models
Documented simulation candidates
- Azure - Dump All Azure Key Vaults with Microburst
Procedure 1b83cddb-eaa7-45aa-98a5-85fb0a8807ea; elevation required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Detection and collection
Attack tools
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.