1200KM / simulation
T1555.001 Keychain — Attack Simulation
Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The…
Technique description
Adversaries may acquire credentials from Keychain. Keychain (or Keychain Services) is the macOS credential management system that stores account names, passwords, private keys, certificates, sensitive application data, payment data, and secure notes. There are three types of Keychains: Login Keychain, System Keychain, and Local Items (iCloud) Keychain. The default Keychain is the Login Keychain, which stores user passwords and information. The…
At least one platform-compatible Atomic procedure is documented. Individual review, lab prerequisites, and validation remain required.
Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models
Documented simulation candidates
- Export Certificate Item(s)
Procedure 1864fdec-ff86-4452-8c30-f12507582a93; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Copy Keychain using cat utility
Procedure 5c32102a-c508-49d3-978f-288f8a9f6617; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Keychain Dump
Procedure 88e1fa00-bf63-4e5b-a3e1-e2ea51c8cca6; elevation required; cleanup not declared. Not executed or individually validated.
- Import Certificate Item(s) into Keychain
Procedure e544bbcb-c4e0-4bd0-b614-b92131635f59; elevation not declared required; cleanup not declared. Not executed or individually validated.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Detection and collection
Attack tools
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.