1200KM / simulation
T1552.005 Cloud Instance Metadata API — Attack Simulation
Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data. Most cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as…
Technique description
Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data. Most cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as…
At least one platform-compatible Atomic procedure is documented. Individual review, lab prerequisites, and validation remain required.
Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models
Documented simulation candidates
- AWS - Retrieve EC2 IAM Role Credentials via IMDSv2
Procedure c9aa1ca4-04df-4623-adac-1f199ca5ce42; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Azure - Dump Azure Instance Metadata from Virtual Machines
Procedure cc99e772-4e18-4f1f-b422-c5cdd1bfd7b7; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Detection and collection
Attack tools
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.