1200KM / simulation
T1547.005 Security Support Provider — Attack Simulation
Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys:…
Technique description
Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys:…
At least one platform-compatible Atomic procedure is documented. Individual review, lab prerequisites, and validation remain required.
Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models
Documented simulation candidates
- Modify HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa Security Support Provider configuration in registry
Procedure afdfd7e3-8a0b-409f-85f7-886fdf249c9e; elevation required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Modify HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig Security Support Provider configuration in registry
Procedure de3f8e74-3351-4fdb-a442-265dbf231738; elevation required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Detection and collection
Attack tools
Existing research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.