T1484.002 Trust Modification — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configuration of trust relationships between domains and tenants to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such as whether or not user identities are federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resources. These trust objects may…

Technique description

At least one platform-compatible Atomic procedure is documented. Individual review, lab prerequisites, and validation remain required.

Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models

Documented simulation candidates

Add Federation to Azure AD
azure-ad automated powershell
Procedure 8906c5d0-3ee5-4f63-897a-f6cafd3fdbb7; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

enterprise cloud-hosted-endpoint identity onprem Identity Provider Windows defense-impairment privilege-escalation isolated_authorized_lab procedure_review_required telemetry_configuration_required potential_disruption_requires_individual_review

can_simulate subtechnique source_mapped

Detection and collection

T1484.002 detection workspace

Attack tools

AADInternals · S0677

Threat actor context

These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.