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T1205.002 Socket Filters — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may attach filters to a network socket to monitor then activate backdoors used for persistence or command and control. With elevated permissions, adversaries can use features such as the `libpcap` library to open sockets and install filters to allow or disallow certain types of data to come through the socket. The filter may apply to all traffic passing through the specified network interface (or every interface if not specified).…

Complete technique description

Adversaries may attach filters to a network socket to monitor then activate backdoors used for persistence or command and control. With elevated permissions, adversaries can use features such as the `libpcap` library to open sockets and install filters to allow or disallow certain types of data to come through the socket. The filter may apply to all traffic passing through the specified network interface (or every interface if not specified). When the network interface receives a packet matching the filter criteria, additional actions can be triggered on the host, such as activation of a reverse shell.

To establish a connection, an adversary sends a crafted packet to the targeted host that matches the installed filter criteria.[haking9 libpcap network sniffing] Adversaries have used these socket filters to trigger the installation of implants, conduct ping backs, and to invoke command shells. Communication with these socket filters may also be used in conjunction with Protocol Tunneling.[exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors][Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020]

Filters can be installed on any Unix-like platform with `libpcap` installed or on Windows hosts using `Winpcap`. Adversaries may use either `libpcap` with `pcap_setfilter` or the standard library function `setsockopt` with `SO_ATTACH_FILTER` options. Since the socket connection is not active until the packet is received, this behavior may be difficult to detect due to the lack of activity on a host, low CPU overhead, and limited visibility into raw socket usage.

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Parent and sub-techniques

Related pages are navigation context. Their tools, rules and lab results are not automatically inherited.

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

Driver Load · source-mapped

DC0079 collection page — Collect Sysmon DriverLoad (6) and retain image path, hash and signature result; distinguish load from file installation.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: driver_path, action, signature_status.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0079",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "driver_path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.sys",
    "action": "load",
    "signature_status": "lab_fixture_only"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Module Load · source-mapped

DC0016 collection page — Scope Sysmon ImageLoad (7) to lab processes/paths; retain module hash, signer and destination process. Inventory alone does not prove a module loaded.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_id, image_loaded, signed, action.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0016",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_id": 4200,
    "image_loaded": "C:\\Lab\\demo.dll",
    "signed": false,
    "action": "load"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Network Connection Creation · source-mapped

DC0082 collection page — Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_guid, destination_ip, destination_port, protocol, initiated.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0082",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "destination_ip": "198.51.100.20",
    "destination_port": 443,
    "protocol": "tcp",
    "initiated": true
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Network Traffic Content · source-mapped

DC0085 collection page — Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
  • Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
  • Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
  • Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
  • Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.

Required normalized fields: flow_id, protocol, method, path, payload_excerpt.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0085",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "flow_id": "lab-flow-1",
    "protocol": "http",
    "method": "GET",
    "path": "/lab-check",
    "payload_excerpt": "LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.

Process Creation · source-mapped

DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.

<EventFiltering>
  <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
    <Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
  </ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>

This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0032",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_guid": "lab-process-001",
    "image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
    "parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
    "command_line": "whoami",
    "user": "LAB\\analyst"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Service Creation · source-mapped

DC0060 collection page — Collect service-install auditing through Audit Security System Extension where supported, plus Service Control Manager/System logs and the new service configuration.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Use a lab-only GPO under Computer Configuration → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration. Enable the specific subcategory named below.
  • For object-level auditing, configure a narrow system access control list (SACL) on the test object in addition to policy. Do not audit an entire production directory by default.
  • Forward Security events from the responsible host or controller; retain subject and target identities, object identifiers, result and original XML. Confirm effective policy with auditpol /get /category:*.

Required normalized fields: service, action, executable, actor.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0060",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "service": "LabService",
    "action": "install",
    "executable": "C:\\Lab\\service.exe",
    "actor": "lab-admin"
  }
}

Visibility limits: A policy checkbox alone does not guarantee an event. Host role, SACL, success/failure selection and audit policy precedence matter. Directory changes may arrive as multiple records.

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

DET0162 Socket-filter trigger → on-host raw-socket activity → reverse connection (T1205.002)

MITRE detection strategy

AN0462 Analytic 0462

Adversary installs/uses packet-capture or raw-socket capability (WinPcap/Npcap, wpcap/packet DLLs or raw socket attach) and sets a filter. A crafted inbound packet is observed; within a short window the host process that loaded capture libraries initiates an outbound connection (e.g., reverse shell) to the packet origin.

Platforms: Windows.

AN0463 Analytic 0463

Process creates a raw/packet socket and attaches a (e)BPF filter (setsockopt SO_ATTACH_FILTER/ATTACH_BPF or bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD)). Immediately after a matching inbound packet, the same process binds/connects outward to a remote host (reverse shell or beacon).

Platforms: Linux.

  • Process Creation — auditd:SYSCALL; channel socket(AF_PACKET|AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, *), setsockopt(… SO_ATTACH_FILTER|SO_ATTACH_BPF …), bpf(cmd=BPF_PROG_LOAD), open/openat path="/dev/bpf*" (BSD/macOS-like) or setcap cap_net_raw..
  • Network Connection Creation — linux:osquery; channel family=AF_PACKET or protocol raw; process name not in allowlist..
  • Network Traffic Content — NSM:Flow; channel Rare inbound packet characteristics (ICMP/UDP/TCP to uncommon port) from src_ip followed ≤TimeWindow by outbound SF from same host to src_ip..

AN0464 Analytic 0464

Process opens /dev/bpf* (libpcap) or loads NetworkExtension filter, then after a crafted inbound packet the same process initiates an outbound connection to the trigger origin.

Platforms: macOS.

  • Process Creation — OpenBSM:AuditTrail; channel open/openat of /dev/bpf*; ioctl BIOCSETF-like operations..
  • Network Connection Creation — macos:unifiedlog; channel First outbound connection from the same PID/user shortly after an inbound trigger..
  • Network Traffic Content — NSM:Flow; channel Inbound one-off packet to uncommon port → outbound SF to same src_ip within TimeWindow..
Source rule directory and observation requirements

No exact-tagged Sigma source rule was imported. This does not establish that the technique is undetectable; the MITRE guidance and collection requirements remain relevant.

Before treating a rule as coverage

  1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
  2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
  3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
  4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1205.002 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

  • Endpoint activity: Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity.
  • Network and protocol telemetry: Per source and observation point: connection rate, destination-host/port fan-out, response/failure ratio and previously unseen destinations. Compare equivalent time windows; separate authorized scanners, NAT and sampling effects.
  • Windows and directory audit: Per principal, host and object: unusual access/request rates, new principal-object relationships, and changes outside approved administration windows. Control for service accounts and scheduled directory maintenance.
  1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
  2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
  3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
  4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

No reviewed lab-tool association is selected for this exact technique. This is a curation gap, not a statement that no tool can implement the behavior.

Software observed in source procedures

These are exact ATT&CK software-use relationships, including malware. They provide behavior context, not recommendations to download or execute malware. No safety or detector claim is inherited.

4 source-documented software associations
  • S0587 Penquin — malware.

    Penquin installs a `TCP` and `UDP` filter on the `eth0` interface.[Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020]

    Exact relationship: relationship--cdf000de-7faa-4251-b1f0-d08e043ef16a
  • S1123 PITSTOP — malware.

    PITSTOP can listen and evaluate incoming commands on the domain socket, created by PITHOOK malware, located at `/data/runtime/cockpit/wd.fd` for a predefined magic byte sequence. PITSTOP can then duplicate the socket for further communication over TLS.[Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024]

    Exact relationship: relationship--cbf7fc6b-ba23-4771-9a32-945cfbf7a72a
  • S1161 BPFDoor — malware.

    BPFDoor uses BPF bytecode to attach a filter to a network socket to view ICMP, UDP, or TCP packets coming through ports 22 (ssh), 80 (http), and 443 (https). When BPFDoor finds a packet containing its “magic” bytes, it parses out two fields and forks itself. The parent process continues to monitor filtered traffic while the child process executes the instructions from the parsed fields.[Sandfly BPFDoor 2022][Deep Instinct BPFDoor 2023]

    Exact relationship: relationship--698640b5-aa2a-45cf-ad49-2f2b13c5e1ea
  • S1224 CASTLETAP — malware.

    CASTLETAP can listen for a specialized ICMP packet for activation on compromised network devices.[Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day]

    Exact relationship: relationship--1631ddf9-4cce-458f-870d-94dd2e83dbf2

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: no compatible candidate in this snapshot. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.

No compatible Atomic procedure is present in this pinned evidence set. Technical feasibility has not been ruled out. A custom procedure must define the behavior, target, collection point, success observable and rollback before execution.

Technique-specific experiment contract

  1. Choose one procedure implementing T1205.002 Socket Filters; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
  2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
  3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
  4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
  5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Socket Filters, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

Source-linked mitigations
  • M1037 Filter Network Traffic

    Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented.

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Detection and collection

T1205.002 detection workspace

No reviewed association in this snapshot.

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.