1200kmSECURITY RESEARCH
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T1195.003 Compromise Hardware Supply Chain — Attack Simulation

Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert a backdoor into consumer networks that may be difficult to detect and give the adversary a high degree of control over the system. Hardware backdoors may be inserted into various devices, such as servers, workstations, network…

Complete technique description

Adversaries may manipulate hardware components in products prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. By modifying hardware or firmware in the supply chain, adversaries can insert a backdoor into consumer networks that may be difficult to detect and give the adversary a high degree of control over the system. Hardware backdoors may be inserted into various devices, such as servers, workstations, network infrastructure, or peripherals.

Official technique definition · Open in the interactive matrix

Parent and sub-techniques

Related pages are navigation context. Their tools, rules and lab results are not automatically inherited.

Detection telemetry and configuration

These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.

Driver Load · source-mapped

DC0079 collection page — Collect Sysmon DriverLoad (6) and retain image path, hash and signature result; distinguish load from file installation.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: driver_path, action, signature_status.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0079",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "driver_path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.sys",
    "action": "load",
    "signature_status": "lab_fixture_only"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

File Metadata · source-mapped

DC0059 collection page — Collect scoped file inventory/FIM metadata with hash algorithm and observation time; preserve original timestamps separately from collector time.

Providers and collection configuration

  • osquery: Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.
  • Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots: Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.
  • Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.
  • Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.
  • Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset.

Required normalized fields: path, size_bytes, sha256, owner_uid.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0059",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "path": "/opt/lab/demo.txt",
    "size_bytes": 64,
    "sha256": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
    "owner_uid": 1000
  }
}

Visibility limits: Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.

Host Status · source-mapped

DC0018 collection page — Collect agent heartbeat and OS health independently; record missed polls, last-seen time and monitor health.

Providers and collection configuration

  • osquery: Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.
  • Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots: Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.
  • Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.
  • Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.
  • Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset.

Required normalized fields: asset_id, status, heartbeat_age_seconds, collector_healthy.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0018",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "asset_id": "lab-host-1",
    "status": "degraded",
    "heartbeat_age_seconds": 90,
    "collector_healthy": true
  }
}

Visibility limits: Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.

Module Load · source-mapped

DC0016 collection page — Scope Sysmon ImageLoad (7) to lab processes/paths; retain module hash, signer and destination process. Inventory alone does not prove a module loaded.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: process_id, image_loaded, signed, action.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0016",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "process_id": 4200,
    "image_loaded": "C:\\Lab\\demo.dll",
    "signed": false,
    "action": "load"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Process Access · source-mapped

DC0035 collection page — Scope Sysmon ProcessAccess (10) to the selected source/target processes and access rights; retain call-trace fields where emitted.

Providers and collection configuration

  • Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
  • Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
  • Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
  • On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
  • Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
  • For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.

Required normalized fields: source_process_id, target_process_id, granted_access, action.

Illustrative collection event

Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.

{
  "schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
  "synthetic": true,
  "timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
  "telemetry_id": "DC0035",
  "collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
  "observation": {
    "source_process_id": 4200,
    "target_process_id": 4300,
    "granted_access": "0x1000",
    "action": "open_process"
  }
}

Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.

Detection rules and analytic guidance

Open the dedicated detection workspace · Existing query engineering

DET0368 Hardware Supply Chain Compromise Detection via Host Status & Boot Integrity Checks

MITRE detection strategy

AN1035 Analytic 1035

Detects tampered hardware or firmware via anomalous host status telemetry. Behavioral chain: (1) Pre-OS or firmware components exhibit unexpected version changes, signature failures, or modified boot paths; (2) System management/firmware tools log hardware inventory drift; (3) Sensor health telemetry or boot attestation events fail baseline checks; (4) Follow-on process execution from altered firmware or unknown drivers after boot.

Platforms: Windows.

  • Host Status — WinEventLog:Security; channel EventCode=1166, 7045.
  • File Metadata — WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-CodeIntegrity/Operational; channel Code integrity violations in boot-start drivers or firmware.
  • Driver Load — WinEventLog:Sysmon; channel EventCode=6.
  • Module Load — WinEventLog:Sysmon; channel EventCode=7.
  • Process Access — WinEventLog:Sysmon; channel EventCode=10.

AN1036 Analytic 1036

Monitors for hardware or firmware tampering by correlating system boot logs, hardware inventory changes, and secure boot/firmware verification failures. Behavioral chain: (1) UEFI/BIOS version drift; (2) secure boot disabled or signature verification errors; (3) unexpected modules or hardware devices enumerated at boot; (4) new device firmware images loaded from non-approved sources.

Platforms: Linux.

  • Host Status — auditd:SYSCALL; channel firmware_update, kexec_load.
  • File Metadata — fwupd:logs; channel Firmware updates applied or failed.

AN1037 Analytic 1037

Detects tampered Mac hardware/firmware by analyzing unified logs, EndpointSecurity events, and Apple Mobile File Integrity (AMFI) checks. Behavioral chain: (1) Boot process reports firmware signature mismatch; (2) Secure Boot policy altered; (3) new EFI drivers or hardware devices appear in inventory; (4) system extension loads from unapproved developer IDs post-boot.

Platforms: macOS.

  • Host Status — macos:unifiedlog; channel EFI firmware integrity check failed.
  • File Metadata — macos:endpointsecurity; channel es_event_authentication.
Source rule directory and observation requirements

No exact-tagged Sigma source rule was imported. This does not establish that the technique is undetectable; the MITRE guidance and collection requirements remain relevant.

Before treating a rule as coverage

  1. Read the actual condition and logsource; identify attacker-side, victim-side or third-party visibility.
  2. Map native sensor fields, parse times and identities, then compile for the selected backend.
  3. Replay a behavior-positive case, a normal control, an authorized look-alike and a missing-telemetry case.
  4. Record matches and misses with rule version and source events. No match is inconclusive when required telemetry is absent.

Anomaly-based detection

No exact technique-specific Atlas model is present for T1195.003 in the selected source snapshot. The following is a design worksheet, not a newly validated model.

Anomaly engineering worksheet

Start from the exact analytic above. The collection-specific lenses below are analyst recommendations; they do not assert that an arbitrary statistical deviation detects this technique.

  • Endpoint activity: Per host role and user: rare process/object combinations, bursts of object access or modification, and ordered parent/action sequences. Compare maintenance windows and signed software rollout activity.
  • Host state and inventory: Compare authorized state snapshots: first-seen drivers/services/modules, unexpected configuration drift and integrity changes. Record collection cadence; absence in a sample is not evidence of deletion.
  1. Define an entity/peer group and feature; exclude the evaluation period from baseline training.
  2. Use representative normal and maintenance activity. Do not invent a production threshold from a synthetic example.
  3. Evaluate held-out behavior-positive and benign cases; measure false positives, misses and telemetry loss separately.
  4. Keep abnormality separate from maliciousness. Correlate with the behavior-specific source evidence.

Anomaly Detection Atlas · Baseline, validation and blind spots

Attack tools and documented software

No reviewed lab-tool association is selected for this exact technique. This is a curation gap, not a statement that no tool can implement the behavior.

Simulation design and documented procedures

Atomic evidence: no compatible candidate in this snapshot. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.

Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.

No compatible Atomic procedure is present in this pinned evidence set. Technical feasibility has not been ruled out. A custom procedure must define the behavior, target, collection point, success observable and rollback before execution.

Technique-specific experiment contract

  1. Choose one procedure implementing T1195.003 Compromise Hardware Supply Chain; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
  2. Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
  3. Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
  4. Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
  5. Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.

Synthetic logs and offline contract check

Download synthetic collection fixture (JSON) · Download the complete engineering workbook

This fixture exercises the listed collection fields. It does not reproduce Compromise Hardware Supply Chain, label its example events as malicious, or measure detection effectiveness. Use the exact analytic and selected procedure to build an independently labelled behavior-positive dataset.

Not run in this browser. No network scan or attack command is executed by this control.

Validation status and remaining work

Source identity
Joined by exact technique/object IDs against hash-pinned sources.
Collection fixture
Available for offline schema exercises; not attack emulation.
Native telemetry / backend / real attack
Not validated for these imported procedures. Source fidelity and page tests cannot establish sensor or detector effectiveness.

All-page audit and evidence inventory · This page’s machine-readable workbook

Sources and evidence boundaries

Pinned MITRE STIX source · SHA-256 81113ba98afa2928f3dcff62022539f7ce30c315c32e14422f11ff95ce534352. Definition and procedure context are reproduced from this snapshot, not independently re-investigated incidents.

Source-linked mitigations
  • M1046 Boot Integrity

    Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification.[TCG Trusted Platform Module][TechNet Secure Boot Process]

Connected ecosystem references

Linked tags

Detection and collection

T1195.003 detection workspace

No reviewed association in this snapshot.

Existing research

Threat Matrix: knowledge routes, evidence and actor context

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner or production-validated detector is asserted. Imported procedures remain unvalidated; any bounded lab evidence has its own scope. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.