1200KM / simulation
T1098.001 Additional Cloud Credentials — Attack Simulation
Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment. For example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure / Entra ID. These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords. With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials…
Technique description
Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment. For example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure / Entra ID. These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords. With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials…
At least one platform-compatible Atomic procedure is documented. Individual review, lab prerequisites, and validation remain required.
Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models
Documented simulation candidates
- AWS - Create Access Key and Secret Key
Procedure 8822c3b0-d9f9-4daf-a043-491160a31122; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Azure AD Application Hijacking - App Registration
Procedure a12b5531-acab-4618-a470-0dafb294a87a; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
- Azure AD Application Hijacking - Service Principal
Procedure b8e747c3-bdf7-4d71-bce2-f1df2a057406; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Detection and collection
Attack tools
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.