1200KM / simulation
T1036.006 Space after Filename — Attack Simulation
Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to…
Technique description
Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to…
At least one platform-compatible Atomic procedure is documented. Individual review, lab prerequisites, and validation remain required.
Official ATT&CK definition · Detection rules and anomaly models
Documented simulation candidates
- Space After Filename (Manual)
Procedure 89a7dd26-e510-4c9f-9b15-f3bae333360f; elevation not declared required; cleanup not declared. Not executed or individually validated.
- Space After Filename
Procedure b95ce2eb-a093-4cd8-938d-5258cef656ea; elevation not declared required; cleanup present, not reviewed. Not executed or individually validated.
Connected ecosystem references
Linked tags
Detection and collection
Attack tools
No reviewed association in this snapshot.
Threat actor context
These are explicit actor-to-technique associations in the existing Threat Matrix snapshot, not attribution of an event or proof that a detector identifies the actor. No tool-to-actor relationship is inferred.
Existing research
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.