Detection telemetry and configuration
These contracts are selected through exact technique-to-data-component relationships or explicitly labelled planning overrides. Configure a collector at the relevant observation point; a telemetry name alone is not coverage.
File Creation · source-mapped
DC0039 collection page — Scope Sysmon FileCreate (11) to the lab directory; retain the process and file path. Differentiate creation/overwrite if the sensor can.
Providers and collection configuration
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
- Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
- Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
Required normalized fields: process_id, path, action, size_bytes.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0039",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_id": 4200,
"path": "C:\\Lab\\demo.txt",
"action": "create",
"size_bytes": 64
}
}
Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
File Metadata · source-mapped
DC0059 collection page — Collect scoped file inventory/FIM metadata with hash algorithm and observation time; preserve original timestamps separately from collector time.
Providers and collection configuration
- osquery: Scheduled host-state queries; supported tables and privileges vary by OS. Select a table that actually exposes the required object.
- Linux Audit plus inventory snapshots: Events explain changes; snapshots describe state at collection time.
- Define the inventory query, allowed host set, interval and least-privileged reader. Store a stable asset ID, observation time and collector version.
- Keep successive snapshots and calculate additions, removals and changed attributes. Pair state changes with audit events when available.
- Export collector health and missed-poll counts so a missing snapshot is not misclassified as a missing asset.
Required normalized fields: path, size_bytes, sha256, owner_uid.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0059",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"path": "/opt/lab/demo.txt",
"size_bytes": 64,
"sha256": "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
"owner_uid": 1000
}
}
Visibility limits: Snapshots miss short-lived objects and do not identify who caused a change. A generic inventory agent is not guaranteed to expose firmware or kernel-level details.
Network Connection Creation · source-mapped
DC0082 collection page — Enable scoped Sysmon NetworkConnect (3), disabled by default, or a platform-equivalent process-aware network sensor.
Providers and collection configuration
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
- Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
- Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
Required normalized fields: process_guid, destination_ip, destination_port, protocol, initiated.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0082",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_guid": "lab-process-001",
"destination_ip": "198.51.100.20",
"destination_port": 443,
"protocol": "tcp",
"initiated": true
}
}
Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
Network Traffic Content · source-mapped
DC0085 collection page — Scope approved packet capture/protocol content collection to the lab flow; retain capture provenance and truncation indicators.
Providers and collection configuration
- Zeek: Connection and protocol metadata from traffic visible to the sensor.
- Suricata EVE: Configured flow, alert, DNS, HTTP, TLS and protocol records.
- Use an authorized lab TAP/SPAN, virtual mirror or gateway interface. Define which traffic crosses it; avoid assuming visibility into every segment.
- Enable the required Zeek analyzers or Suricata EVE event types. Export logs with sensor identity, clock synchronization and flow correlation identifiers.
- Monitor capture loss, truncation and exporter sampling. Capture payload only with approval and restrictive retention; encryption normally prevents plaintext inspection.
Required normalized fields: flow_id, protocol, method, path, payload_excerpt.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0085",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"flow_id": "lab-flow-1",
"protocol": "http",
"method": "GET",
"path": "/lab-check",
"payload_excerpt": "LAB_TELEMETRY_CHECK"
}
}
Visibility limits: Flows are not packet payloads. NAT, asymmetric routes, encryption, missing mirrors and sampling can hide attribution or content. A destination connection alone does not prove malicious intent.
Process Creation · source-mapped
DC0032 collection page — Collect Sysmon ProcessCreate (1); preserve ProcessGuid and parent identifiers. Security 4688 is an alternative with separate audit/command-line settings.
Providers and collection configuration
- Microsoft Sysmon: Windows event-based collection; enable the event types needed below.
- Linux Audit: Linux alternative for supported system-call and file events; different semantics and fields.
- Apple Endpoint Security clients: macOS alternative where the subscribed event exists; requires an entitled, approved client, not an iOS collector.
- On a disposable Windows host, review the installed Sysmon schema and current configuration; merge scoped event filters into the existing policy rather than replacing it.
- Forward Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational to the lab collector. Preserve event ID, timestamp, computer, process identifiers and the original event.
- For Linux or macOS, select the equivalent sensor separately and test its emitted fields; a Windows event ID does not transfer across platforms.
Required normalized fields: process_guid, image, parent_image, command_line, user.
<EventFiltering>
<ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
<Image condition="is">C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe</Image>
</ProcessCreate>
</EventFiltering>
This fragment only selects the named process. It is not a complete production policy. Inspect the installed schema with sysmon64 -s; preserve existing rules, then apply the reviewed complete configuration with sysmon64 -c <configuration-file>.
Illustrative collection event
Project-normalized synthetic JSON, not a native provider log, captured event, attack verdict or validated detection. A parser/adapter is required for a real SIEM. Example names, IPs and values are fictional.
{
"schema": "1200km.telemetry.example.v1",
"synthetic": true,
"timestamp": "2026-09-27T12:00:00Z",
"telemetry_id": "DC0032",
"collector": "illustrative-lab-collector",
"observation": {
"process_guid": "lab-process-001",
"image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\whoami.exe",
"parent_image": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
"command_line": "whoami",
"user": "LAB\\analyst"
}
}
Visibility limits: Event filtering and sensor versions change coverage. High-volume image-load and process-access collection needs tuning; endpoint events alone do not establish intent.
Simulation design and documented procedures
Atomic evidence: 3 compatible documented candidates. Live lab status: not run for these imported procedures.
Use disposable lab hosts and test accounts, explicit target allowlists, a clean snapshot, bounded egress and a restore plan. Review every candidate and dependency before any execution.
Embedded Script in Image Execution via Extract-Invoke-PSImage
This atomic test demonstrates the technique of data obfuscation via steganography, where a PowerShell script is concealed within an image file.
The PowerShell script is embedded using steganography techniques, making it undetectable by traditional security measures. The script is hidden
within the pixels of the image, enabling attackers to covertly transfer and execute malicious code across systems.
The test begins by ensuring the availability of the malicious image file and the Extract-Invoke-PSImage script. The test proceeds to extract the hidden
PowerShell script (decoded.ps1) from the image file using the Extract-Invoke-PSImage tool. The extracted script is then decoded from base64 encoding and saved as a
separate PowerShell (textExtraction.ps1). Consequently, the textExtraction.ps1 script is executed.
In the case of this atomic test, the malicious image file which is downloaded has the powershell command Start-Process notepad embedded within in base64. This
is done to emulate an attackers behaviour in the case they were to execute malware embedded within the image file.
Pinned Atomic procedure · 04bb8e3d-1670-46ab-a3f1-5cee64da29b6 · windows · powershell.
Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
image_file: Malicious Image file which will be downloaded (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\T1001.002\bin\evil_kitten.jpg)psimage_script: Extract-Invoke-PSImage Script downloaded (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\ExternalPayloads\Extract-Invoke-PSImage.ps1)
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
2 prerequisite definitions:
- Image file must exist
- Extract-Invoke-PSImage must exist
Execute Embedded Script in Image via Steganography
This atomic test demonstrates the execution of an embedded script in an image file using steganography techniques. The script is first encoded in base64 and then embedded within the pixels of the image. The modified image is created, and the script is extracted and executed on the target system.
Pinned Atomic procedure · 4ff61684-ad91-405c-9fbc-048354ff1d07 · linux · sh.
Elevation: not declared required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
script: Shell Script file to be embedded and executed (type String; source default PathToAtomicsFolder/script.sh)evil_image: The modified image with embedded script (type String; source default PathToAtomicsFolder/evil_image.jpg)image: Image file to be embedded (type String; source default PathToAtomicsFolder/image.jpg)
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
Steganographic Tarball Embedding
This atomic test, named "Steganographic Tarball Embedding", simulates the technique of data obfuscation via steganography by embedding a tar archive file (tarball)
within an image.
The test begins by ensuring the availability of the image file and the tarball file containing data . It then generates random passwords and saves them to a
file. Subsequently, the tarball file is created, containing the passwords file. The test executor command reads the contents of the image
file and the tarball file as byte arrays and appends them together to form a new image file. This process effectively embeds the tarball
file within the image, utilizing steganography techniques for data obfuscation.
This atomic test simulates the technique of data obfuscation via steganography, enabling attackers to clandestinely transfer files across systems undetected.
By embedding the tarball file within the image, adversaries can obscure their activities, facilitating covert communication and data exfiltration.
Pinned Atomic procedure · c7921449-8b62-4c4d-8a83-d9281ac0190b · windows · powershell.
Elevation: required. Cleanup: defined upstream; review required. This is source documentation, not an execution approval.
image_file: Image file which will be downloaded to be used to hide data (type path; source default PathToAtomicsFolder\T1001.002\bin\T1001.002.jpg)tar_file: Tarz file containing random passwords (type path; source default $env:PUBLIC\Downloads\T1001.002.tarz)new_image_file: new image file ready for extraction (type path; source default $env:PUBLIC\Downloads\T1001.002New.jpg)passwords_file: Text file containing random passwords (type path; source default $env:TEMP\random_passwords.txt)
Review the upstream command, dependencies and cleanup at the source link. Source defaults may refer to real infrastructure or destructive actions; they are not authorized targets. No automatic install, prerequisite download or command execution is provided.
3 prerequisite definitions:
- Image file must exist
- File to hide within tarz file must exist
- Tarz file to embed in image must exist
Technique-specific experiment contract
- Choose one procedure implementing T1001.002 Steganography; identify the observable behavior in the source definition, not just its tactic.
- Record exact target, tool/version, inputs, privileges, network limits and approval. Never run an imported default target automatically.
- Enable the collection sources above and verify a benign baseline reaches the detector.
- Run only the approved isolated scenario; capture native events and an independent behavior observable.
- Evaluate the exact rule/model, restore the lab, and preserve configuration, event hashes, alerts, controls and misses.