1200KM / sigma-rule
PUA - AdvancedRun Suspicious Execution — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule fa00b701-44c6-4679-994d-5a18afa8a707. PUA - AdvancedRun Suspicious Execution — Sigma Rule. Detects the execution of AdvancedRun utility in the context of the TrustedInstaller, SYSTEM, Local Service or Network Service accounts
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems). Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2022-01-20 / 2023-02-21.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "process_creation"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 1f2f8c63f76002ec75374e385085920650cb4bb091ddd722bf3152899d8a8846
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: PUA - AdvancedRun Suspicious Execution
id: fa00b701-44c6-4679-994d-5a18afa8a707
related:
- id: d2b749ee-4225-417e-b20e-a8d2193cbb84
type: similar
status: test
description: Detects the execution of AdvancedRun utility in the context of the TrustedInstaller, SYSTEM, Local Service or Network Service accounts
references:
- https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1483815103279603714
- https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3
- https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/operation-bleeding-bear
- https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-01-20
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1134.002
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- '/EXEFilename'
- '/CommandLine'
selection_runas:
- CommandLine|contains:
- ' /RunAs 8 '
- ' /RunAs 4 '
- ' /RunAs 10 '
- ' /RunAs 11 '
- CommandLine|endswith:
- '/RunAs 8'
- '/RunAs 4'
- '/RunAs 10'
- '/RunAs 11'
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_advancedrun_priv_user/info.yml
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
- https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1483815103279603714
- https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3
- https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/operation-bleeding-bear
- https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.