1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential Privileged System Service Operation - SeLoadDriverPrivilege — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule f63508a0-c809-4435-b3be-ed819394d612. Potential Privileged System Service Operation - SeLoadDriverPrivilege — Sigma Rule. Detects the usage of the 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege' privilege. This privilege is required to load or unload a device driver. With this privilege, the user can dynamically load and unload device drivers or other code in to kernel mode. This user right does not apply to Plug and Play device drivers. If you exclude privileged users/admins and processes, which are allowed to do so, you are maybe left with bad programs trying to load malicious kernel drivers. This will detect Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs) and the usage of Sysinternals and various other tools. So you have to work with a whitelist to find the bad stuff.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2019-04-08 / 2026-03-29.
{
"product": "windows",
"service": "security"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: c2374153cb1728b476fb0f503c25f0fa80c72e19649c5788d7a198d5cbb6863e
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential Privileged System Service Operation - SeLoadDriverPrivilege
id: f63508a0-c809-4435-b3be-ed819394d612
status: test
description: |
Detects the usage of the 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege' privilege. This privilege is required to load or unload a device driver.
With this privilege, the user can dynamically load and unload device drivers or other code in to kernel mode.
This user right does not apply to Plug and Play device drivers.
If you exclude privileged users/admins and processes, which are allowed to do so, you are maybe left with bad programs trying to load malicious kernel drivers.
This will detect Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs) and the usage of Sysinternals and various other tools. So you have to work with a whitelist to find the bad stuff.
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20230331181619/https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4673
author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes)
date: 2019-04-08
modified: 2026-03-29
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection_1:
EventID: 4673
PrivilegeList: 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege'
Service: '-'
filter_main_exact:
ProcessName:
- 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\HelpPane.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\Dism.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\fltMC.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\ShellHost.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\SystemSettingsBroker.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\System32\wimserv.exe'
filter_optional_others:
ProcessName|endswith:
- '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
- '\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
- '\procexp.exe'
- '\procexp64.exe'
- '\procmon.exe'
- '\procmon64.exe'
filter_main_startswith:
ProcessName|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft'
filter_optional_dropbox:
ProcessName|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\'
- 'C:\Program Files\Dropbox\'
ProcessName|endswith: '\Dropbox.exe'
condition: selection_1 and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Other legimate tools loading drivers. Including but not limited to, Sysinternals, CPU-Z, AVs etc. A baseline needs to be created according to the used products and allowed tools. A good thing to do is to try and exclude users who are allowed to load drivers.
level: medium
False positives
- Other legimate tools loading drivers. Including but not limited to, Sysinternals, CPU-Z, AVs etc. A baseline needs to be created according to the used products and allowed tools. A good thing to do is to try and exclude users who are allowed to load drivers.
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.