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Non Interactive PowerShell Process Spawned — Sigma Rule

Sigma rule f4bbd493-b796-416e-bbf2-121235348529. Non Interactive PowerShell Process Spawned — Sigma Rule. Detects non-interactive PowerShell activity by looking at the "powershell" process with a non-user GUI process such as "explorer.exe" as a parent.

Rule metadata and linked tags

Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements). Source status: test; severity: low. Source dates: 2019-09-12 / 2025-02-28.

{
  "category": "process_creation",
  "product": "windows"
}

Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1

Source SHA-256: e4310d2179dec258be5c8c294f3b8cb1bd67ff4db587a3d04339303c2e04aeb7

Detection logic

Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.

title: Non Interactive PowerShell Process Spawned
id: f4bbd493-b796-416e-bbf2-121235348529
status: test
description: Detects non-interactive PowerShell activity by looking at the "powershell" process with a non-user GUI process such as "explorer.exe" as a parent.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20200925032237/https://threathunterplaybook.com/notebooks/windows/02_execution/WIN-190410151110.html
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (rule), oscd.community (improvements)
date: 2019-09-12
modified: 2025-02-28
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\powershell.exe'
              - '\pwsh.exe'
        - OriginalFileName:
              - 'PowerShell.EXE'
              - 'pwsh.dll'
    filter_main_generic:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - ':\Windows\explorer.exe'
            - ':\Windows\System32\CompatTelRunner.exe'
            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\explorer.exe'
    filter_main_windows_update:
        ParentImage: ':\$WINDOWS.~BT\Sources\SetupHost.exe' # During Windows updates/upgrades
        # CommandLine: powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Restricted -Command Write-Host 'Final result: 1';
    filter_optional_vscode:
        # Triggered by VsCode when you open a Shell inside the workspace
        ParentImage|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe'
        ParentCommandLine|contains: ' --ms-enable-electron-run-as-node '
    filter_optional_terminal:
        ParentImage|contains: ':\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.WindowsTerminal_'
        ParentImage|endswith: '\WindowsTerminal.exe'
    filter_optional_defender:
        ParentImage|endswith: ':\Program Files\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\SenseIR.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Likely. Many admin scripts and tools leverage PowerShell in their BAT or VB scripts which may trigger this rule often. It is best to add additional filters or use this to hunt for anomalies
level: low

Original YAML and metadata in JSON

False positives

  • Likely. Many admin scripts and tools leverage PowerShell in their BAT or VB scripts which may trigger this rule often. It is best to add additional filters or use this to hunt for anomalies

Source references

Connected ecosystem references

Exact source-tagged techniques

Telemetry review

Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.

Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.