1200KM / sigma-rule
Suspicious Service Installed — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule f2485272-a156-4773-82d7-1d178bc4905b. Suspicious Service Installed — Sigma Rule. Detects installation of NalDrv or PROCEXP152 services via registry-keys to non-system32 folders. Both services are used in the tool Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU)
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes). Source status: test; severity: medium. Source dates: 2019-04-08 / 2023-08-17.
{
"category": "registry_set",
"product": "windows"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 90309a211bab99584313a14d64699dc23a0be6767b4273b808ac2d310aefdcd8
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Suspicious Service Installed
id: f2485272-a156-4773-82d7-1d178bc4905b
status: test
description: |
Detects installation of NalDrv or PROCEXP152 services via registry-keys to non-system32 folders.
Both services are used in the tool Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs), which uses KDU (https://github.com/hfiref0x/KDU)
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20200419024230/https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/
author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes)
date: 2019-04-08
modified: 2023-08-17
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
category: registry_set
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetObject:
- 'HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\NalDrv\ImagePath'
- 'HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\PROCEXP152\ImagePath'
filter:
Image|endswith:
# Please add the full paths that you use in your environment to tighten the rule
- '\procexp64.exe'
- '\procexp.exe'
- '\procmon64.exe'
- '\procmon.exe'
- '\handle.exe'
- '\handle64.exe'
Details|contains: '\WINDOWS\system32\Drivers\PROCEXP152.SYS'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Other legimate tools using this service names and drivers. Note - clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the services. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.
level: medium
False positives
- Other legimate tools using this service names and drivers. Note - clever attackers may easily bypass this detection by just renaming the services. Therefore just Medium-level and don't rely on it.
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.