1200KM / sigma-rule
Suspicious PsExec Execution - Zeek — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule f1b3a22a-45e6-4004-afb5-4291f9c21166. Suspicious PsExec Execution - Zeek — Sigma Rule. detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron, Tim Shelton. Source status: test; severity: high. Source dates: 2020-04-02 / 2022-12-27.
{
"product": "zeek",
"service": "smb_files"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 77394605b30a8318f7b5d130e81ff94a9f74bf4fd7c3e56778120a44cb0ac523
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Suspicious PsExec Execution - Zeek
id: f1b3a22a-45e6-4004-afb5-4291f9c21166
related:
- id: c462f537-a1e3-41a6-b5fc-b2c2cef9bf82
type: derived
status: test
description: detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one
references:
- https://web.archive.org/web/20230329171218/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html
author: Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron, Tim Shelton
date: 2020-04-02
modified: 2022-12-27
tags:
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1021.002
logsource:
product: zeek
service: smb_files
detection:
selection:
path|contains|all:
- '\\'
- '\IPC$'
name|endswith:
- '-stdin'
- '-stdout'
- '-stderr'
filter:
name|startswith: 'PSEXESVC'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.