1200KM / sigma-rule
Potential Abuse of Linux Magic System Request Key — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule ea61bb82-a5e0-42e6-8537-91d29500f1b9. Potential Abuse of Linux Magic System Request Key — Sigma Rule. Detects the potential abuse of the Linux Magic SysRq (System Request) key by adversaries with root or sufficient privileges to silently manipulate or destabilize a system. By writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger, they can crash the system, kill processes, or disrupt forensic analysis—all while bypassing standard logging. Though intended for recovery and debugging, SysRq can be misused as a stealthy post-exploitation tool. It is controlled via /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq or permanently through /etc/sysctl.conf.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Milad Cheraghi. Source status: experimental; severity: medium. Source dates: 2025-05-23 / not supplied.
{
"product": "linux",
"service": "auditd",
"definition": "Required auditd configuration:\n-w /proc/sysrq-trigger -p wa -k sysrq\n-w /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq -p wa -k sysrq\n"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 5fc561970df6c8b48ccd7b679800dee736cc8c792e1d7839e03f1920e0b36a49
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Potential Abuse of Linux Magic System Request Key
id: ea61bb82-a5e0-42e6-8537-91d29500f1b9
status: experimental
description: |
Detects the potential abuse of the Linux Magic SysRq (System Request) key by adversaries with root or sufficient privileges
to silently manipulate or destabilize a system. By writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger, they can crash the system, kill processes,
or disrupt forensic analysis—all while bypassing standard logging. Though intended for recovery and debugging, SysRq can be
misused as a stealthy post-exploitation tool. It is controlled via /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq or permanently through /etc/sysctl.conf.
references:
- https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.10/_sources/admin-guide/sysrq.txt
- https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/4/html/reference_guide/s3-proc-sys-kernel
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/threat-update-awfulshred-script-wiper.html
author: Milad Cheraghi
date: 2025-05-23
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.004
- attack.impact
- attack.t1529
- attack.t1489
- attack.t1499
logsource:
product: linux
service: auditd
definition: |
Required auditd configuration:
-w /proc/sysrq-trigger -p wa -k sysrq
-w /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq -p wa -k sysrq
detection:
selection:
type: 'PATH'
name|endswith:
# Enable
- '/sysrq'
- '/sysctl.conf'
# Execute
- '/sysrq-trigger'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative activity
level: medium
False positives
- Legitimate administrative activity
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.