1200KM / sigma-rule
Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object SPN Spoofing — Sigma Rule
Sigma rule e7a21b5f-d8c4-4ae5-b8d9-93c5d3f28e1c. Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object SPN Spoofing — Sigma Rule. Detects DNS queries containing patterns associated with Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing. The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure. Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts. It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
Rule metadata and linked tags
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems). Source status: experimental; severity: high. Source dates: 2025-06-20 / not supplied.
{
"product": "windows",
"category": "dns_query"
}Pinned original Sigma rule · Detection Rule License 1.1
Source SHA-256: 5de8781de89e989c297ce5c3d6d24faa80591250ffa4305c65569fb3bbd96ae8
Detection logic
Original source YAML. Source-tag agreement is not proof of complete semantic coverage. This rule has not been compiled for a SIEM backend or validated against live telemetry here.
title: Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object SPN Spoofing
id: e7a21b5f-d8c4-4ae5-b8d9-93c5d3f28e1c
related:
- id: b07e58cf-cacc-4135-8473-ccb2eba63dd2 # Potential Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object Spoofing
type: similar
- id: 5588576c-5898-4fac-bcdd-7475a60e8f43 # Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object Spoofing - Network
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects DNS queries containing patterns associated with Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing.
The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure.
Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts.
It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records
to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073.
references:
- https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
- https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-06-20
tags:
- attack.collection
- attack.credential-access
- attack.persistence
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1557.001
- attack.t1187
logsource:
product: windows
category: dns_query
detection:
selection:
QueryName|contains|all:
- 'UWhRCA'
- 'BAAAA'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
False positives
- Unknown
Source references
Connected ecosystem references
Exact source-tagged techniques
Telemetry review
Read the original logsource above, then inspect the linked detection workspaces for technique-level sensor context. No per-rule telemetry equivalence is inferred.
Pinned research references. No browser attack runner, live simulation result or validated detector is asserted. Source mappings and validation limits are preserved. ATT&CK / Atomic provenance · Detection provenance.